An AI bubble is not the only threat to the stock market - The Telegraph
Tom Stevenson writes about investment for fund manager Fidelity International following a 20-year career in financial journalism, most recently at the Daily Telegraph. His no-nonsense weekly column gives an investor's eye view of the most important market, economic and business stories.
Are investors looking in the wrong direction? Ask them what threatens the stock market today, and they will point to artificial intelligence.
The latest Bank of America survey confirms this. More than six in 10 fund managers see either an AI bubble or the debts accumulated to finance the AI boom as the biggest threat to the bull market. Only one in eight is worried about bond yields.
History suggests they may be worrying about the wrong thing. Bull markets do not die of old age. They are murdered by the Fed. Like most stock-market adages, this is an oversimplification, but it contains more than a grain of truth. Most of the big market reversals in my lifetime have been associated with a tightening of monetary policy. And sometimes the killer is not the Fed alone. Occasionally, the bond market can do its dirty work.
At the start of the year, US interest rates were between 3.5pc and 3.75pc and were expected to fall by half a percentage point. After September’s quarter-point increase, they are between 3.75pc and 4pc today, and expected to rise at each of the next three Federal Reserve rate-setting meetings. That is a significant reversal in expectations.
Perhaps the most vivid example of a bond-market warning to stock-market investors was the 1987 crash. During that year, the 10-year Treasury yield rose from 7pc to 10pc, and for eight months the equity market ignored the straws in the wind. By August, shares had risen by 30pc. Then on one grim day in October, they fell by 20pc in a single session.
What makes 1987 an interesting parallel is the fact that the crash was never signalled by a problem with corporate earnings. What happened was simpler. The stock market became increasingly expensive when compared with the returns available on bonds. There were other factors, including computer-driven trading, but the crash was a great lesson right at the start of my career that shares can appear resilient until suddenly they are not.
The two big bear markets in the middle of my career were also associated with, if not caused by, rising rates and yields. Between June 1999 and May 2000, the Fed raised its policy rate from 4.75pc to 6.5pc. The 10-year Treasury yield initially followed suit.
The Nasdaq index peaked in March 2000 and then lost 80pc of its value. The conventional wisdom says this was the bursting of a speculative bubble that had inflated on unrealistic expectations for internet businesses. That is true but not the whole story.
The reality was that investors were increasingly reliant on expectations for future profits. Rising interest rates increased the discount rate used to put a present-day value on those as-yet unearned profits. And tighter policy meant they were less valuable in the here and now. It created a less favourable environment for companies that were busily consuming rather than generating cash.
Seven years later, higher interest rates once again exposed financial fragility. Between 2004 and 2006, the Fed raised rates from 1pc to 5.25pc. This undermined the housing boom. Higher borrowing costs exposed the fragility of the credit supporting the expansion. Again, the stock market continued rising through the rate-hiking cycle until the chickens came home to roost.
The most recent example of rising interest rates calling time on a bull market was in 2022. The 10-year US Treasury yield rose that year from 1.5pc to 4pc, the S&P 500 fell by 19pc and the Nasdaq by 33pc. The biggest casualties were expensive growth stocks, the companies most reliant on future profits growth to justify their high valuations. Again, there was no earnings recession. The damage was caused by a large rise in real yields.
There are four reasons why rising yields matter. First, higher risk-free yields reduce the present value of uncertain future returns.
Second, high government-bond yields are increasingly attractive to investors, who demand a higher prospective return from shares. The quickest way to achieve this is via a lower price.
Third, higher borrowing costs put pressure on earnings. They affect companies, households and governments alike, and in time this feeds through into spending, profits and investment.
Finally, when interest rates rise far and fast enough, they expose the cracks in leveraged investments and aggressive business models that make sense in an environment of cheap money but turn out to be reckless when capital once again has a cost.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of today’s situation is that bond yields are rising in the absence, yet, of an aggressive monetary tightening cycle. Sometimes the bond market can do the Fed’s work for it. Long bond yields can rise for a variety of reasons – inflation, fiscal concerns, but also stronger growth expectations.
And that is why it is too simplistic to say: rates are rising, the stock market must fall. The best counter-example came in 1994 when the Fed doubled its policy rate from 3pc to 6pc, triggering a historic sell-off in the bond market but hardly troubling shares at all. The peak-to-trough decline for the S&P 500 was about 9pc, and the index subsequently enjoyed a powerful rally on the back of strong earnings growth.
The lesson from history is not that higher interest rates inevitably kill bull markets. It is rather that they make expensive shares vulnerable to disappointed expectations. Sometimes, the economy is strong enough to withstand the pressure. Sometimes it is not.
Investors are understandably worried about whether AI will live up to its promise. But they should be just as concerned about the price they are paying for that promise and the interest rate used to value it. The cost of money may sound inconsequential in the context of a technological revolution, but in the end it’s what really matters.
Tom Stevenson is an investment director at Fidelity International. These views are his own


