An ode to America's most useless federal agency - Newsweek

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On Thursday, the Transportation Security Administration turns 25, an occasion to celebrate one of Washington's more remarkable achievements—transforming a national trauma into a permanent administrative inconvenience.

On Thursday, the Transportation Security Administration turns 25, an occasion to celebrate one of Washington's more remarkable achievements—transforming a national trauma into a permanent administrative inconvenience.

Established by Congress on November 19, 2001, the TSA has spent a quarter-century teaching Americans that the price of liberty includes surrendering their toothpaste, enduring invasive pat-downs and watching agents inspect a toddler's stuffed animal for explosives.

Its genius lies in making the performance of security indistinguishable from security itself.

Bruce Schneier, the renowned security technologist and cryptographer who coined the term "security theater," told Newsweek that he invented the expression specifically to describe the TSA.

"Even now, the most consequential improvements in airplane security since 9/11 were reinforcing the cockpit door and teaching passengers they need to fight back," Schneier said. "So much of everything else is security theater."

After 25 years, the agency can point to millions of screened passengers, thousands of confiscated weapons and the absence of another September 11.

But how much of that safety is owed to the checkpoint? Schneier's point is that the biggest changes happened beyond it.

Before 9/11, passengers were generally advised to cooperate with hijackers, who were expected to make demands rather than use the aircraft as a weapon. The passengers aboard United Flight 93 learned what the hijackers intended and fought back. Today, anyone trying to seize a plane must reckon with passengers and crew who know what is at stake.

Then there are reinforced cockpit doors. On September 11, the terrorists gained access to the cockpits, overpowered the pilots and took control of the planes. Stronger doors, kept locked during flight, make that far more difficult. Even if hijackers smuggle weapons aboard, they still have to reach the controls to turn an aircraft into a missile.

Neither change requires a federal employee to investigate the contents of your shoes.

But Jeffrey Price, a professor of aviation at Metropolitan State University of Denver and lead author of Practical Aviation Security, argues that Schneier gives passengers too much credit. They may never realize a hijacking is underway, he told Newsweek, and future attackers could use firearms or explosives rather than the knives carried on September 11.

"Screening procedures are not security theater," Price said. "I know it’s popular to call the process security theater, and there are valid benefits to a little bit of theater, but there needs to be a robust system in place behind the curtain. I believe there is."

Yet here we are, going through the motions of an airport screening process that involves "forbidden" liquids and elaborate inspections of otherwise ordinary belongings.

The TSA, responding to Newsweek's request for comment, defended its record, pointing to the thousands of prohibited items its officers identify each year. The agency cited recent discoveries—including a knife concealed in a toothpaste tube at Dallas Love Field and a smoke grenade hidden in a jar of peanut butter at an Indianapolis airport.

The agency said its defenses extend beyond checkpoints, combining screening with intelligence sharing, canine teams, unpredictable security measures and partnerships with the aviation industry. It said screening procedures are continually adjusted using intelligence, security testing and technology-performance data.

But for all this scrutiny, the TSA has struggled with some of the threats it is supposed to catch. A 2019 government audit found that nine security weaknesses uncovered by undercover testing had still not been formally resolved as of September 2018.

Price cautions against judging today's screening system solely by older government findings. Technology and procedures have changed, he said, and he wants more recent testing.

To be fair, a locked cockpit cannot stop someone from detonating a bomb aboard a plane. Screening passengers and their belongings serves a real purpose. The question is how much of the TSA's elaborate rule book actually helps.

Price points to a historical precedent. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, American airliners were hijacked with alarming frequency. After the federal government introduced universal passenger and baggage screening in January 1973, the number of hijackings of U.S. carriers fell from 26 in 1972 to two in 1973. The drop cannot be attributed to screening alone, but Price argues that even the comparatively primitive security of that era deterred attackers.

He also challenges the demand for proof of attacks prevented.

"It is also difficult to measure deterrence," Price said. "How often does an attack not take place because of screening measures or other security layers?"

Even Schneier favors federal airport screeners over poorly paid private contractors. His objection is to what those employees are made to do.

"So much of it—taking off your shoes, scanning laptops separately, photo ID checks, confiscations of even the smallest blades, limitations on liquids—doesn't make us any safer," he said.

Although the TSA's examples show that its officers find dangerous and prohibited objects, they leave a harder question unanswered. How many of those discoveries prevented an attack, and which screening rules were responsible?

What's more, the question that those in charge should perhaps contend with after 25 years of doing things this way is which ones of these procedures actually prevent attacks and which merely inconvenience passengers?

It's been a quarter of a century, so the TSA should be able to answer those questions. If it cannot tell Americans which inconveniences actually make them safer, it has little business insisting on them.

Price believes the screening system has earned its place. The challenge for the TSA is demonstrating which parts of that system deserve to stay.

After all, the point of airport security is to stop terrorists, not to make ordinary passengers prove they aren't one.

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