“Children from families without money go to the SDF” One remark set off an uproar··· Debate over ‘economic conscription’ flares up in Japan[Lee Yoon-jung’s Soso World] - 경향신문

This article was translated by an AI tool. Feedback Here.

Japan Self-Defense Forces. Wikipedia

“Economically struggling children go into the SDF. Affluent children do not go into the SDF.” This single remark, made in the National Diet in June, upended Japanese society. It was a comment by Koga Chikage of the Constitutional Democratic Party. Discussing how some of her former students who had joined the SDF were having a hard time, she spoke to the effect that economically struggling children go into the SDF.

Koga’s remarks drew a flood of criticism online. Comments said, “She disparaged the SDF as a job only for the poor.” In the end, Koga withdrew the statement and apologized. Yet even after the apology, the controversy over ‘economic conscription’ continued. Many asked whether, in reality, there are not a few young people who choose the SDF as a job for economic reasons.

Japan’s Self-Defense Forces are run on an all-volunteer basis. Article 9 of the Constitution stipulates the renunciation of war and of settling international disputes by force, but under an interpretation that possessing the minimum capability for self-defense is permissible, the government operates the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces. Contrary to the image of a ‘country that cannot wage war,’ in reality Japan maintains a sizable armed organization, and it has to recruit all of that manpower directly. The most pressing concern now in Japan is precisely those ‘people.’

As of March 31 this year, the authorized number of SDF personnel compiled by the Ministry of Defense is 247,154. The actual headcount is 217,701, only 88.1% of the authorized strength. In other words, about 29,453 are missing.

Even the authorized strength itself is larger than one might think. Japan is known as a country that has renounced war under its Constitution, and unlike South Korea it is not facing a hostile state across an armistice line. Yet the SDF has an authorized strength close to 250,000. Considering that South Korea, which confronts North Korea militarily, maintains approximately 500,000 active-duty troops, it is hard to regard the SDF in Japan as a small organization.

What is more surprising is that this scale did not suddenly grow with the recent rise in tensions around China and North Korea. The SDF expanded rapidly right after its establishment, surpassing 240,000 in the 1960s and reaching about 258,000 in 1969. Even after the end of the Cold War, it did not undergo a massive reduction and has maintained a size around 250,000. The current 247,154 has changed little since the mid-2010s.

So the present concern in Japan is not that it lacks people because it ‘must expand the military.’ Even the long-maintained 250,000-strong SDF has now become hard to staff with volunteers alone. Unlike South Korea, Japan cannot impose conscription on youth of a certain age, so it has to secure all needed personnel through hiring. That is why the SDF has to be chosen by the younger generation as one job among many, not as a ‘national duty.’

The problem is that, due to the low birthrate and population decline, fewer and fewer people are choosing a career as professional soldiers. In particular, filling the enlisted ranks is a serious issue. According to Ministry of Defense data, as of March 2025 the fulfillment rate for ‘Sa,’ the general enlisted rank among fixed-term SDF personnel who serve for a set period, was only 60.7%. Nearly 40% of the authorized positions are vacant. The ministry has also recently named securing ‘Sa’ as an urgent task.

If you join because you are poor, is that ‘conscription’?

New fixed-term SDF personnel can apply if they are at least 18 and under 33. Those who are 32 can also apply under certain conditions. Applications are accepted throughout the year.

Starting this year, a new fixed-term system has been introduced that abolishes the previous SDF cadet scheme and appoints recruits as second-class ground, maritime, or air ‘Sa’ at the moment of enlistment. Rather than merely waiting for young people, the SDF has jumped directly into the ‘recruitment market’ by overhauling entry pathways and treatment.

Recruitment results have improved a little recently. For fiscal 2025, the number hired is 11,177, up 14.9% from the previous year. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defense still sees securing SDF personnel as a key task. The gap between authorized strength and actual headcount remains about 30,000.

Seen this far, the ‘economic conscription’ debate in Japan reads a little differently. Japan has no draft. The government cannot forcibly take poor young people. To enter the SDF, an individual must apply and pass selection. In that case, is it a ‘discriminatory prejudice’ to say that economically struggling youth choose that job, or is it a reality that actually exists?

In Japan, some point out that the SDF can be a practical career option for young people who need to become independent from their parents quickly, who need a livelihood base, or who face the burden of tuition. The fixed-term SDF personnel system also has a structure to support their entry into society after completing service.

A representative case often cited is the popular Japanese comedian Yasuko. She enlisted in the Ground Self-Defense Force at 18. Her parents divorced when she was young, and she grew up in a difficult family environment; in high school she lived in a child welfare facility. At the time, the facility required her to leave at 18, but Yasuko neither had the means to go to university nor a suitable home in which to live independently. She later explained on air that “because I had no guardian, it was difficult even to rent a home or to open a mobile phone line,” describing why she chose the SDF back then.

Lawmaker Koga Chikage. House of Councillors website

The remark by Koga, “Affluent children do not go to places like the SDF,” drew backlash because it sounded as if it defined the SDF as a place that ‘poor young people go because they have no other options.’ From the standpoint of SDF personnel, their career choices and sense of mission were being reduced to a result of economic hardship.

Another factor heightening the backlash in Japan was that the SDF is not only responsible for national defense but is also the organization most quickly deployed to rescue and recovery sites during major disasters such as earthquakes, typhoons, and floods. Local assemblies and politicians who are former or current SDF personnel protested that the comment fostered prejudice against the profession of SDF personnel and damaged the dignity and pride of the members and their families. Criticism of “occupational discrimination” came not only from the ruling party but also from the opposition.

Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi immediately countered that it was a misperception of the facts to speak as if the children of SDF personnel all came from poor households, saying the comment looked at SDF personnel and their families in a one-sided way. The reality that some young people choose the SDF for economic reasons cannot be denied. The problem lay in using that fact to lump all SDF personnel together as “a job chosen by kids from poor homes.”

The controversy sparked by the Japanese politician’s statement that “affluent children do not go to the SDF” is not unfamiliar in South Korea either. In South Korea, the military ought to be neither a profession chosen because one lacks money nor an option one can avoid because one has money. In the face of conscription, the rich and the poor must not be given different choices. Perhaps, in looking at Japan’s ‘economic conscription’ debate, this is the point that South Korean society is most immediately reminded of.