Election promises leave Lula with a tougher fiscal challenge - Valor International

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President Lula’s election-year spending promises and tax concessions have added roughly R$40 billion in fiscal pressures to Brazil’s 2027 budget, complicating efforts to stabilize the country’s rapidly rising public debt.

President Lula’s election-year spending promises and tax concessions have added roughly R$40 billion in fiscal pressures to Brazil’s 2027 budget, complicating efforts to stabilize the country’s rapidly rising public debt.

The commitments, some approved before Lula’s runoff victory in October, include expanded social benefits, incentives for small businesses and tax revenue losses. None was included in the budget proposal submitted to Congress before the election, according to an analysis by economist Manoel Pires of the Getulio Vargas Foundation.

Beyond their immediate cost, the measures reflect growing competition for public resources as Lula embraces policies traditionally associated with his opponents, adding a pro-entrepreneurship agenda to his longstanding emphasis on social protection. The dispute could complicate fiscal sustainability not only in 2027 but for years to come.

In the fiercely contested presidential election, promises to expand public programs proliferated. At the same time, candidates also committed to preserving existing policies that specialists believe need review. Seeking reelection, Lula used his executive authority to approve or even sign some of those measures into law before the runoff. The campaign intensified competition for budget resources and narrowed the scope for fiscal adjustment amid an already challenging environment of unsustainable debt growth, fiscal fatigue and an increasingly adverse political outlook.

In the final stretch of the campaign, Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro incorporated at least parts of each other’s agendas into their promises. Lula won reelection after raising the revenue ceiling for individual microentrepreneurs and after a government representative promised to forgive federal tax debts owed by businesses under the Simples Nacional simplified tax regime.

Those measures show that, in addition to maintaining policies aimed at expanding the social safety net, a hallmark of Lula’s political career, the reelected president also embraced part of a pro-entrepreneurship agenda more commonly associated with the opposition. The result is greater competition for budget resources to win over lower- and middle-income voters, with potential consequences for the fiscal sustainability debate in 2027 and beyond.

The estimates and analysis come from economist Manoel Pires, coordinator of the Center for Fiscal Policy and Public Budgeting at the Brazilian Institute of Economics of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV Ibre). The subject is examined in the institute’s November economic bulletin, Carta do Ibre.

Pires notes that Brazil’s current fiscal difficulties involve not only high public debt but also its rapid growth. General government gross debt rose from 71.7% of GDP in December 2022 to 82.9% in August 2026, an increase of five percentage points of GDP in that period.

General government net debt, he added, stands 17.1 percentage points of GDP above the threshold associated with what economists call fiscal fatigue. This is a situation in which debt has reached such a high level that the government’s ability to generate the fiscal adjustments needed to stabilize it becomes increasingly constrained, exposing the country to greater fiscal risks.

More comprehensive reforms are needed, Pires argued. According to Pires, the behavior of Brazil’s interest-rate market immediately after the first and second rounds of the election underscored the importance of fiscal adjustment.

After the first round, the benchmark Ibovespa stock index rose 7.7%, the real strengthened 4.4%, and the interest-rate curve fell about 1.35 percentage points. The movements were attributed to expectations of fiscal adjustment under Flávio Bolsonaro, who had won the first round.

Pires noted that Bolsonaro’s economic team had discussed a constitutional amendment involving R$200 billion in fiscal measures, but without providing technical details. It was not even clear whether the figure referred to one year or the full four-year presidential term.

But the market chose to believe it, Pires noted.

Between the first and second rounds, both candidates competed to make promises with fiscal costs, moving in the opposite direction from the anticipated adjustment that had supposedly reassured investors. Even so, the interest-rate curve on October 20 was virtually identical to its level on the day after the first round.

On Monday, October 26, following Lula’s victory, Brazilian assets deteriorated sharply. The real lost 7.6% against the dollar, the Ibovespa plunged 13.9%, and the interest-rate curve rose by two to three percentage points.

“Unlike in previous campaigns, when promises were left until after the inauguration, this time the candidate who won reelection used his executive powers before the vote,” Luiz Guilherme Schymura wrote in Carta do Ibre, referring to measures Lula formally approved before the election result was known.

The campaign commitments, Pires said, require revisions to the proposed 2027 federal budget, which Congress received before the election.

He estimates that new expenditures total R$29 billion, including R$22.7 billion for Bolsa Família, Brazil’s main cash-transfer program for low-income households; R$5 billion for Desenrola 3.0, the third phase of a government debt renegotiation initiative; and R$1.25 billion for cash transfers to eligible individual microentrepreneurs.

According to the government, the microentrepreneur cash-transfer program is expected to cost R$5 billion over four years.

Pires assumes that the university version of Pé-de-Meia, which extends financial assistance originally designed for high school students to those attending university, will be financed within existing education spending allocations.

On the revenue side, Pires estimates losses of R$12.6 billion.

These include R$5.1 billion from the ban on online betting and R$4 billion from raising the revenue ceiling for individual microentrepreneurs and forgiving federal debts owed by businesses covered by the simplified tax regime.

Pires also includes R$3.5 billion in lost revenue from the excise tax created under Brazil’s tax reform to replace the federal tax on manufactured goods, known as IPI.

The new excise was scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2027, when the existing manufacturing tax would be abolished, except in the Manaus Free Trade Zone.

Because the excise rules were not finalized on schedule, the government issued an executive decree with the force of law postponing its introduction until February 2.

At the same time, the administration submitted a proposal to Congress to amend the Constitution and temporarily maintain the manufacturing tax during January 2027. The amendment has yet to be voted on.

If approved, Pires said, the temporary continuation of the existing tax should offset the revenue loss caused by the delay in introducing the selective tax.

For Pires, the measures reflect an election campaign in which candidates demanded commitments from their opponents more intensely than in previous contests.

“On one side, there was a proliferation of promises to expand public policies. On the other, candidates were demanding political commitments from their opponents to preserve existing policies that might otherwise have been reviewed,” he said.

Some of those programs, he noted, were already the subject of discussions about possible changes that could form part of a broader fiscal adjustment.

Among Lula’s promises, the university version of Pé-de-Meia follows the approach of expanding access to public benefits. So does his proposal for free public transportation on weekends, which would be financed using resources equivalent to 26.5% of individual and congressional delegation earmarks transferred to municipalities.

By contrast, forgiving federal debts owed by individual microentrepreneurs and raising the program’s revenue ceiling are part of a pro-entrepreneurship agenda normally associated with the opposition, Pires said.

“It was a way for Lula to put constraints on his opponent during the campaign and in the public debate,” he said.

Congress had already wanted to approve an increase in the revenue ceiling, but the government had been dragging out the discussion since last year.

“I believe this measure was inevitable. Congress was on the verge of approving it regardless of the government’s position. What’s new in Lula’s proposal is the R$5,000 cash transfer for low-income participants in the program.”

On the entrepreneurship side, Flávio Bolsonaro had proposed reviving Perse, a pandemic-era tax relief program originally designed under former President Jair Bolsonaro’s administration. The program was criticized for benefiting large businesses, Pires recalls.

Perse was initially intended to support small businesses affected by social distancing measures during the Covid-19 pandemic, such as restaurants and companies in the events industry.

“There is now a problem of competing for budget space to win over lower- and middle-income voters. In the 2022 election, when Lula proposed exempting monthly earnings of up to R$5,000 from income tax, he was targeting precisely that group. Now we’re seeing competition for budget resources to promote public policies associated with a pro-entrepreneurship state,” Pires said.

That competition raises several questions.

The first, and perhaps most immediate, is how to pay for the new commitments.

“The entrepreneurship agenda is gaining ground and support, but the welfare state has not been abandoned.”

During the campaign, Pires argued, both sides dug in their heels. They created political constraints on reallocating budget resources away from previously established benefits.

The entrepreneurship agenda, he notes, does not replace the social welfare agenda. The two are likely to coexist and compete for resources within an already strained budget.

Another question is whether the new policies are effective and deliver on their promises.

Pires recalls that Lula created the individual microentrepreneur program in 2008 to bring low-income self-employed workers into the formal economy and give them access to social protections.

At the time, the diagnosis was that high taxes were preventing those workers from formalizing their activities.

In practice, however, the program attracted many relatively well-paid professionals who switched to the regime to reduce their tax burden.

“And how can all of this be reconciled?” Pires asked.

“Society supports campaigns against excessive government spending, but when it comes down to it, everyone supports expanding public programs. How can we reconcile the desire to expand public policies with the budget constraints we face and the high level of debt? Ultimately, that conflict is what has brought us to fiscal fatigue since 2015.”

Schymura noted that the expansion of the entrepreneurship agenda is taking place at a time when the welfare-state model may be “showing some signs of exhaustion.”

“The welfare state itself is beginning to demand different things. It’s no longer just about more money. It’s about better-quality public services, a health care system that reaches certain areas, broadband access in some places. There is considerable complexity to this.”

For Schymura, the question is how much these developments might change Lula’s economic policies during his next term.

Of the R$29 billion in new expenditures not included in the proposed 2027 budget, Pires says, part of the additional spending on Bolsa Família could be accommodated through internal reallocations under the current fiscal spending rules.

The government’s new fiscal package, estimated to have an impact of up to R$60 billion, points in that direction.

Pires believes the supplementary bill containing the fiscal package broadly follows principles adopted in earlier initiatives.

The measures are wide-ranging, seeking savings across different parts of the budget. They include efforts to expand discretionary spending flexibility, strengthen the government’s ability to freeze expenditures, introduce new fiscal adjustment triggers, and address social-fairness measures, such as excessive public-sector salaries and tax expenditures.

“The most important aspect of the bill is that its design, in a way, revives the concept established by the Fiscal Responsibility Law that fiscal balance should be ensured during budget execution—something that has gradually been lost over time.”

By expanding the scope for expenditure freezes, the bill creates more room to manage fiscal execution and meet budget targets, helping restore a fiscal policy response mechanism that has weakened since 2015, Pires noted.

“I believe the supplementary bill should be seen as a bridge between the resumption of fiscal control and some more structural measures that appear to be under discussion.”

Pires says it is still unclear who will serve as finance minister, who will make up the economic team during Lula’s fourth term, or what political agreement will underpin budget decisions.

But beyond revising the budget proposal to incorporate campaign promises, the government faces other immediate issues it must address.

“The government extended the subsidies through November, and they are becoming expensive, costing around R$15 billion a month. We have a gap between domestic and international prices, particularly for diesel. The situation is unsustainable. Obviously, after the election campaign, it is very difficult for the government to simply press a button and eliminate everything. But there will have to be some strategy for gradually phasing out this policy.”

Bráulio Borges, a director at economic consultancy LCA and a researcher at FGV Ibre, noted that oil prices have followed a different trajectory from what was expected when the fuel policy was designed.

The expectation was that the conflict in the Middle East would end around mid-2026 and that oil prices would return to levels seen before the war, around $65 to $70 a barrel.

But prices have not developed as anticipated, he said.

After exceeding $100 a barrel at various points over two months, oil prices eased in early November, falling below $90 in the past week.

Borges also pointed out that higher oil prices have generated additional federal revenue, helping keep projections for the primary budget deficit relatively stable.

This article was translated from Valor Econômico using an artificial intelligence tool under the supervision of the Valor International editorial team to ensure accuracy, clarity, and adherence to our editorial standards. Read our Editorial Principles.

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