Europe’s businesses are paying for Russia’s hybrid war
Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, author of the award-winning “Goodbye Globalization” and a regular columnist for POLITICO. Her new book, “The Undersea War,” is out Oct. 8.
Plots against defense executives, a series of arson attacks against private companies and warehouses, and explosive drones at Germany’s Leipzig/Halle Airport.
Had any of these worked as intended, they would have caused immense damage, not to mention claimed lives.
This is the situation plaguing Europe today, faced as it is with a proliferation of gray-zone attacks. And while a definitive response from the continent is yet to materialize, the bloc has finally started to name and address the hybrid war it’s been pulled into. No, summits and statements won’t thwart attacks, but acknowledgement is famously the first step to recovery.
It was only a miracle that saved workers at Leipzig airport when, on Aug. 4, an approaching drone landed poorly and lost its load of explosives. Had things gone to plan, it would have exploded next to a Ukrainian Antonov plane ready for departure, causing immense damage to a busy airport servicing the people and businesses of large parts of Germany. (Investigators later found a second drone laden with military-grade explosives right next to the airport.)
But who would want to maim and kill airport users? On Sept. 1, the German government announced it had determined Russia was behind the attack.

Years ago, European governments would have preferred not to publicly attribute such reckless incidents because with attribution comes the need to respond. But this time Germany openly identified the Kremlin as the instigator, showing just how seriously Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government is taking the incident.
That’s because the failed drone explosion is only the latest in a series of sinister activity of which Germany has been a particular target.
Just before the country’s national election in 2025, the exhaust pipes of hundreds of cars were sabotaged across the country, and stickers calling for people to vote for the Greens attached to their windows. While that last touch suggested environmental activists were behind the campaign, the perpetrators were later identified as agents working on Russia’s behalf.
A couple of months earlier, a parcel — which turned out to contain a bomb — caught fire at DHL’s depot at Leipzig/Halle Airport. The perpetrators of this event, too, were later found to be working for Russia. And a few months before that, German authorities uncovered a Russian assassination plot against arms manufacturer Rheinmetall’s CEO.
You all know about these cases, not just because I’ve written about them on these pages but because they were so brazen. And Germany is not the only country to see all manner of businesses — and even business executives — targeted by geopolitically linked strikes. The U.K. has been hit by arson, as have Poland, the Czech Republic and other European countries.
In September 2025, objects in the skies above airports in Denmark and Norway forced temporary closures. Drones keep appearing around Scottish offshore installations. Numerous Swedish communication masts have sustained suspicious damage. And in the Baltic Sea, there has been a string of suspicious cable and pipeline incidents.

So far, none of these incidents have caused devastating damage — though a 2024 arson attack subsequently attributed to Russia destroyed Poland’s largest shopping mall. But each attempt costs the affected businesses money. Each piece of sabotaged infrastructure incurs repair costs and operational losses. Each disruption causes delays and further expenses. In fact, most targeted companies have seen their operations disrupted, which means additional financial hits.
In the case of the undersea cables struck by anchors, the owners were left with significant repair bills. For power cables, repairs typically run into the tens of millions of euros. Each incident also costs personnel time. Had the Leipzig drones or parcel bombs exploded, the financial losses — and, of course, the human losses — would have been extremely painful.
Even a relatively small incident can leave the target facing significant damage: Last month WB Group, a Polish drone-component manufacturer, was subject to an arson attack and incurred losses of at least €3.5 million. Polish prosecutors believe the attack was, again, instigated by Russia.
But when all this happens, who foots the bill?
If the companies are lucky, their insurers will. However, standard insurance only covers standard perils. It doesn’t cover war-like acts, which is what geopolitically linked acts of harm amount to. At least that’s what many standard insurers are unsurprisingly contending. And while specialized war insurers do offer coverage for war, doing so involves having to decide what exactly constitutes war-like acts.
The most detailed discussion of this fundamental question isn’t taking place at think tanks or universities. They’re taking place in the insurance industry, as vast amounts of money are at stake. And this — rendering European companies’ operations financially unsustainable — may, in fact, be Russia’s objective.

Credit to the German government for convening the Baltic Sea Security Summit in August to accelerate European nations’ response to a discreditable and dangerous form of geopolitical score-settling, and for calling the Kremlin out.
Now, how will these subversive attacks on European companies continue to unfold? You will have to find out without me, as this is my farewell as a columnist for POLITICO. It has been an immense pleasure and honor to have your company. Arrivederci!
POLITICO occasionally publishes opinion pieces from guest authors to offer our readers a range of perspectives on the intersection of power and politics. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of POLITICO.


