Hindutva and the limits of Indian diplomacy

India likes to present itself as a voice of peace, dialogue and the Global South. Prime Minister Narendra Modi speaks of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam - the world as one family - and promotes Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas. India has also repeatedly spoken of an era of dialogue and diplomacy rather than war. But South Asia has a right to ask a simple question: do India's actions towards its neighbours match its rhetoric? The recent unrest in Nepal provides a disturbing starting point. Violence following a Hindu religious procession in Sunsari exposed growing communal tensions in a country with a long tradition of religious coexistence. Hindu nationalist organisations with links to India have expanded their presence in Nepal, while Hindu identity is increasingly being used for political mobilisation. During Nepal's constitutional transition, Hindu nationalist groups in India openly lobbied for the restoration of Nepal's Hindu-state status. This is not the first time India has intervened deeply in Nepal's political affairs. During Nepal's 2015 constitutional crisis, the Indian government itself acknowledged maintaining close contact with Nepal's political leadership and monitoring the situation closely. India denied imposing a blockade, while Nepal and others blamed the disruption of supplies on the border crisis. The larger point is that India has long regarded developments in Nepal as a matter of vital strategic interest. The question is whether that interest has now acquired an ideological dimension. This brings us to Hindutva. The problem is not Hinduism, but the political idea that Hindu identity should occupy a dominant position in the definition of the Indian nation. When that idea becomes the basis of politics, Muslims and other religious minorities inevitably face the question of whether they are being treated as equal citizens or as communities expected to live within a Hindu-majoritarian national framework. This concern is not merely theoretical. Human Rights Watch has documented increasing vilification of Muslims, discriminatory policies and unlawful demolitions of Muslim homes and properties under the BJP-led government. Its 2026 report also records attacks against Christians and other minorities. The continuing demolition of Muslim religious and historic sites makes the question even more uncomfortable. Indian authorities have generally cited encroachment, unauthorised construction or development requirements in individual cases. But when mosques, shrines and other Muslim sites are repeatedly removed or challenged, it inevitably raises a larger question: is India merely dealing with illegal structures, or is a new political narrative also attempting to reduce the visible presence of its Muslim history? Recent demolitions of mosques in Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh have intensified that debate. India's Muslim history cannot simply be removed from the national story. It is part of India's history, just as its Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain and other traditions are. If Hindutva seeks to redefine India primarily through Hindu civilisation, its influence beyond India deserves scrutiny as well. The contradiction becomes sharper over water. India placed the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance in April 2025. The treaty governs rivers vital to Pakistan's agriculture and economy and had survived wars and decades of hostility. On August 31, 2026, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled unanimously that the treaty remained fully in force and that the grounds cited by India did not justify its suspension. India rejected the ruling. Water is not an ordinary instrument of geopolitical pressure. For Pakistan, the Indus system is a matter of agriculture, food security and human survival. How does the language of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam sit with using control over a vital resource as leverage against a neighbour? The same question arises from regional economic cooperation. SAARC has effectively been paralysed since the 2016 summit was cancelled after India withdrew from the Islamabad meeting following the Uri attack. Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Bhutan and Sri Lanka subsequently also stayed away. India participates actively in the G20, BRICS, SCO, Quad and BIMSTEC, so it is clearly not opposed to multilateralism. The question is whether it prefers regional arrangements in which its enormous weight gives it greater influence, rather than an institution where India and Pakistan sit as equal members. Afghanistan presents another contradiction. India has chosen to engage the Taliban. In January 2025, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, with both sides discussing expanding relations, trade and development cooperation. There is nothing inherently wrong with diplomatic engagement. But if India has access to Kabul, why has it not used that access to help reduce tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan? China has actively attempted to mediate between Kabul and Islamabad, while Turkey has also worked with both sides to promote dialogue. India has the diplomatic channels to do the same if it chooses to. This is particularly relevant because a UNSC-mandated monitoring report found that the Taliban continued supporting the TTP and that this contributed to increased frequency and lethality of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The report also identified growing operational links among the TTP, Al Qaeda, ISIL-K and the BLA. India's engagement with Kabul may serve legitimate strategic interests. But strategic engagement and peace-building are not necessarily the same thing. India is unquestionably the largest power in the region. But there is a fundamental difference between regional leadership and regional dominance. Leadership means allowing neighbours to prosper, respecting their constitutional choices, keeping vital resources outside political confrontation, supporting regional institutions and using influence to reduce conflict. That is why India's slogans deserve to be tested against its conduct. Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam sounds noble. Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas sounds inclusive. But the region will ultimately judge these principles not by speeches in Delhi, but by what happens to its water, trade, security, connectivity, minorities and sovereignty.