How China-linked parts in Indian military drone tenders raise alarm
Iranian military repeatedly boasting about its ability to take control of unmanned platforms operated by the United States and its allies through electronic warfare and cyber capabilities has underlined a growing reality of modern warfare—that a drone’s greatest vulnerability may not be its airframe but the technology inside it.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claim to have hijacked several US drones in the ongoing war in West Asia. Also, in August, the military world was jolted by the discovery that cameras fitted to the UK Royal Navy’s K3 Scout unmanned platforms were periodically sending “heartbeat” signals to a China-based internet address. The drones, built by a London-based company and inducted into the Royal Navy, were reportedly being prepared for operations in the strategically sensitive Persian Gulf.
For India, these developments come at an uncomfortable time. Four recent Indian military procurement tenders, floated between September and this month through the government’s GeM (Government e-Marketplace) portal, have brought the country’s military drone supply chain under scrutiny.
The GeM is India’s official, centralised online procurement portal created for ministries, government departments, public sector undertakings and the armed forces for transparently buying goods and services directly from registered vendors.
An examination of the four tenders’ technical specifications has identified several components carrying brands headquartered or primarily manufacturing in China, despite India’s stated push to keep Chinese-origin equipment out of sensitive military platforms. These include HGLRC’s ELRS 2.4G receiver, flight controller, video transmitter, flight controller and electronic speed controller (ESC) stacks, and lithium-ion battery pack and motors.In one bid, components such as a 1700KV motors Nano camera, diversity receiver, dual-band ExpressLRS receiver and analogue goggles are among the other branded components identified. The assessment places these brands in the Chinese-origin category based on their headquarters or principal manufacturing base rather than any verification of the country-of-origin labels of the individual products.
Apart from branded components, one tender also lists several unbranded items that are likely considered to be of Chinese origin, primarily on the basis of their competitive pricing and availability in the market. These include 5.8G dual antennas, triple-feed patch 5.8 GHz antennas, seven-inch propellers and lightweight two-axis brushless gimbals. However, their country of origin has not been independently established.
Similarly, bids also include services such as 3D-printed mounts, assembly, integration, configuration, tuning and flight testing, a two-in-one hot-air gun and lead-free soldering iron kit, and smoke stoppers. These are service-related requirements rather than components and have, therefore, been kept outside the component-origin assessment.
The findings expose a contradiction in India’s drone manufacturing ambitions. While the government is encouraging domestic companies to develop indigenous platforms and components, procurement specifications appear to continue accommodating products associated with foreign brands.
Smit Shah, president of the Drone Federation of India, a key drone industry body, flagged the issue on X, questioning why the industry was being encouraged to manufacture indigenous components while foreign-branded products were still finding their way into military procurement through GeM. “Industry is promoting indigenous drone components on one hand and Chinese paglus buying drone components from GeM for military use,” Shah posted.
Industry representatives say they have repeatedly approached the government, seeking an approved list of components and a vetted list of Indian vendors for military drone procurement. “There should be standardisation of the GeM portal for buying military platforms. At least the Indian military should come out with a comprehensive list of Chinese-origin components,” said an industry insider.
The issue is not necessarily that every foreign-branded component violates an existing restriction. Rather, industry sources argue that the absence of a comprehensive, clearly communicated procurement standard leaves room for inconsistent interpretation and implementation.
For a military platform, procurement cannot be treated like an ordinary commercial purchase. The origin, ownership, software dependencies and security credentials of critical components matter as much as their price and performance.
India has been aware of these vulnerabilities. In 2023, the government moved to restrict Chinese-origin components in military drones, particularly cameras, communication equipment, radio systems and operating software. Restrictions were also discussed for equipment and sub-components originating from countries sharing a land border with India. The Army Design Bureau was subsequently tasked with developing a framework to assess and mitigate cybersecurity vulnerabilities in military drones, following consultations with the armed forces and industry. The framework reportedly remained pending with the ministry of defence for nearly 20 months.
After the Army Design Bureau completed its internal framework in mid-2025, the ministry of defence released a draft Drone Security Framework this March for public consultation. It proposed mandatory secure-by-design requirements, supply-chain traceability and a 20-point clearance checklist.
However, the framework is yet to be permanently incorporated into the upcoming Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2026. A proposed Rs 2,000-crore incentive scheme to encourage domestic component manufacturing has also not been formally notified.
The armed forces, meanwhile, are reportedly continuing to enforce existing restrictions and vetting equipment through dedicated facilities, such as the Indian Army’s AASHVAST testing laboratory. This is where the four military tenders become significant. India is working towards a more rigorous security regime, but procurement specifications are already raising questions about how consistently existing safeguards are being applied.
The Iranian episode offers a broader lesson. Even a component sourced from an apparently acceptable country or vendor may carry vulnerabilities that are not immediately visible through conventional procurement checks.
Modern drones are interconnected systems. Their flight controllers, navigation equipment, radio links, cameras, data transmission systems and software work together. A weakness in one critical element can potentially compromise the reliability or security of the entire platform.
Country-of-origin screening is, therefore, necessary, but it cannot be the only line of defence. Components can be routed through third countries, sold under ‘white-label’ arrangements or supplied through intermediaries. Industry sources have raised concerns about precisely these practices, which can make the actual origin of a component difficult to establish.
There is also an economic complication. Stricter sourcing requirements have reportedly increased production costs, putting additional pressure on Indian manufacturers trying to scale up quickly. Domestic companies need access to reliable components at competitive prices, yet cost considerations cannot come at the expense of military security.
The urgency is evident from the scale of India’s planned expansion. Industry estimates suggest that tactical drones worth Rs 3,000-4,000 crore have been delivered to the armed forces since Operation Sindoor in May 2025. The military is expected to procure additional unmanned systems worth at least Rs 15,000 crore over the next two years.
India is estimated to have between 2,000 and 2,500 operational military drones across the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Army is also working towards a much larger structure, with an eventual ambition of deploying 8,000-10,000 drones per military corps and building a fleet exceeding 100,000 platforms.
Meeting these targets would require more than assembling drones domestically. India will need a dependable ecosystem for motors, batteries, flight controllers, cameras, communication systems, navigation equipment and other critical electronics.
The four tenders offer an early indication of the challenges ahead. India’s military drone programme is expanding rapidly, but the supply chains supporting that expansion have not yet been secured to the same degree. Iran’s reported drone-hacking capabilities may be a reminder of what can happen when electronic warfare and technology vulnerabilities intersect.
For India, the lesson should be clear: building a large drone fleet is one challenge; ensuring that every platform can be trusted is another. The real test of India’s indigenous drone ambitions will not simply be how many drones it can manufacture but how much control it exercises over the technology inside them.
Deputy Editor with India Today magazine. Primarily reports on defence and strategic affairs. An old school journalist, who believes in plainspeak. A print journalist who has worked at several mainstream national newspapers and magazine. In over two decades of journalism journey, he has been breaking stories and shaking things up with his investigative reports. He enjoys tracking political upheavals in the country.

