India’s theatre command push marred by capability gaps, readiness concerns

The Modi government’s push for Integrated Theatre Commands has faced growing criticism and concerns over its implementation. The emphasis on political objectives and tight deadlines risks coming at the expense of military professionalism and could undermine the combat effectiveness of India’s armed forces across the three services.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) remains the most visible victim, but critical shortages in the army and navy further expose the dangerous fragility of India’s defence posture.

The Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control and Discipline) Act, 2023, was introduced in the Lok Sabha on Mar 15, 2023, passed during the Monsoon Session and received presidential assent on Aug 15, 2023. It came into effect on May 10, 2024, while the rules were notified on May 27, 2025, granting the executive sweeping powers over joint military structures.

By early 2026, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan had submitted recommendations for three theatre commands — Northern, Western and Maritime — while a Joint Operations Centre was being prepared for operational status by the end of May under pressure to meet government deadlines before the CDS’s extended tenure ended.

This politically mandated restructuring overrides professional concerns and service-specific doctrines, turning a potentially valuable reform into a high-risk gamble.

The crisis within the IAF is dire. As of Apr 2026, the force operates only 29 fighter squadrons — its lowest level in decades — down from roughly 31-32 before the full retirement of the MiG-21 in September 2025. This is well below the sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons.

Each squadron fields 18-20 aircraft, giving India a total combat fleet of roughly 464-522 jets. Major platforms include 258 Russian-built Su-30MKIs, 36 French-made Rafales, more than 40 Russian MiG-29s and only 30-plus locally made Tejas Mk1 aircraft.

Pakistan maintains about 25 squadrons, comprising an estimated 387-450 combat aircraft, while China deploys 66 fighter squadrons and more than 1,200 fighters. Projections suggest that the IAF could reach only 35-36 squadrons by 2035, despite orders for 141 Tejas Mk1A aircraft and procurement clearance for 114 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) in February 2026. Discussions about raising the target to 54-56 squadrons highlight the scale of the gap.

The strain is not limited to the air domain. The Indian Army faces persistent equipment shortfalls and manpower challenges. As of 2026, several infantry and artillery units continue to rely on outdated systems. The artillery modernisation plan remains delayed, with critical gaps in long-range precision munitions and air defence systems.

Mountain warfare capabilities along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have also been hampered by slow infrastructure development and equipment shortages, amid heightened tensions with China since the June 2020 Galwan Valley clash.

The Indian Navy operates only one aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya, while the full operationalisation of INS Vikrant has been delayed by technical and logistical issues. Its submarine fleet has also faced significant shortfalls, with India operating only 15-16 conventional submarines, many of them ageing, against a requirement of at least 24. The number of nuclear-powered attack submarines remains limited.

Destroyer and frigate numbers are insufficient for effective multi-domain operations across the vast Indian Ocean region, particularly amid China’s growing naval presence. Indigenous shipbuilding delays and budget constraints have further widened these gaps, raising questions about the Maritime Theatre Command’s preparedness even before its full implementation.

The IAF has strongly resisted the permanent division of its depleted assets among the three theatre commands, warning that such fragmentation could undermine air power’s core advantage of flexibility.

Similar concerns have been raised across the other two services. The army is concerned about losing operational control of assets, while the navy fears its limited blue-water capabilities could be stretched too thin.

Yet pressure to proceed with the restructuring has continued despite these concerns, contributing to increased inter-service friction since the 2023 Act and the 2025 rules.

Since the post of CDS was created on Jan 1, 2020, the government has outlined a series of reforms, including binding joint orders in July 2025, while planning for the restructuring was reportedly more than 90 per cent complete.

However, chronic under investment, with defence spending consistently below 2.5 per cent of GDP, procurement delays and a multi-vendor fleet have continued to pose challenges for the armed forces.

The gap between the reform plans and existing capabilities remains significant. With only 29 IAF squadrons, fewer than 522 combat aircraft, limited naval platforms and delays in army modernisation, questions remain over the pace at which India can strengthen its overall military capabilities.

The accelerated 2026 restructuring could have long-term strategic implications. Without corrective measures, including substantially increased defence spending, addressing critical shortages across the services, avoiding the forced division of assets and building greater professional consensus, the Integrated Theatre Commands could face significant operational and strategic challenges.