Iran endured, Pyongyang learned[Three fault lines revealed by the U.S.·Iran war]③ - 경향신문

This article was translated by an AI tool. Feedback Here.

U.S. President Donald Trump posted on his social media on the 13th of last month (local time) a photo from his first North Korea·U.S. summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Truth Social screengrab

There is little disagreement that North Korea, which calls itself a ‘nuclear-armed state’, would have closely watched the process of negotiating the U.S.·Iran end-of-war memorandum of understanding (MOU). For North Korea, this war was likely not a distant conflict in a foreign land, but a live manual for preparing for a possible clash on the Korean Peninsula.

Putting together the analyses of experts interviewed by the Kyunghyang Shinmun on the 2nd, North Korea appears to have drawn two major ‘lessons of war’ from the U.S.·Iran war. They are the conviction that “you survive only by holding nuclear weapons” and the distrust that “the United States can change at any time.”

North Korea added Article 61 to the new constitution revised at the Supreme People's Assembly in March, stipulating that it will “establish a military-centered ethos and make flawless preparations for an all-people resistance.” This is similar to how Iran, which suffered a crushing defeat in the ‘12-day war’ last June sparked by Israel, subsequently moved in effect into a wartime system to prepare for future clashes. By specifying a constant wartime posture in the constitution, it seeks internal control and cohesion, and externally aims to send a warning signal to “do not provoke recklessly.”

The establishment of Article 89, which delegates the command and use authority of nuclear forces to a separate body, is also significant. It puts into the constitution a declaration that a nuclear counterstrike is possible even if the top decision-maker is incapacitated.

This appears to be a step that places the emphasis on an external warning. The procedures for delegation of nuclear use are already mostly reflected in the nuclear forces policy law North Korea enacted in 2022. After watching as a large share of the leadership in Iran, including former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was eliminated, North Korea is interpreted as having sent, through the constitutional revision, a warning to the United States and others that “the nuclear forces will operate even if Chairman Kim is incapacitated.” Hong Min, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said, “It is intended to plant in the United States the perception that it will respond even when cornered, and a warning that it must not be dealt with as with Iran,” adding, “This Supreme People's Assembly reflected to a considerable extent the lessons of war from the U.S.·Iran war.”

There is also an analysis that North Korea's counterpart to Iran's trump card, the ‘Strait of Hormuz,’ is ‘South Korea and Japan.’ If a similar situation arises on the Korean Peninsula, the global semiconductor supply chain could collapse, and new growth-driver industries such as data centers, artificial intelligence (AI), and robotics could grind to a halt. This would be a shock of a different form and scale from the oil supply disruptions caused by a Hormuz blockade. Even mere bluster such as North Korea planting mines or posing maritime threats is expected to inflict massive disruptions on South Korea's cargo throughput. Recently, North Korea deployed the 5,000-ton-class destroyer Choe Hyon-ho to the West Sea. Cho Han-bum, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said, “North Korea knows that South Korea·Japan can hold the global economy hostage even more powerfully than the Strait of Hormuz,” adding, “Against this backdrop, it is strengthening its recent offensive against the South.”

With APEC in November approaching, focus is on whether North Korea·U.S. talks will resume···What about South Korea?

Since the U.S.·Iran war, the threshold for negotiations over the North Korean nuclear program has become incomparably higher. The ‘paradox of nuclear deterrence’ demonstrated in the U.S.·Iran war is likely to be received by North Korea, which claims to be a nuclear-armed state, as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. At the same time, distrust toward the Trump administration is higher than ever. Watching the United States carry out airstrikes in the middle of nuclear talks, even speak of the end of the civilization of Iran, and then return to negotiations, observers expect North Korea to approach the resumption of North Korea·U.S. dialogue with maximum caution or passivity. Lim Eul-chul, a professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University, said, “North Korea aims to prevent even the word ‘denuclearization’ from coming out from the United States and others, and it is also highly likely to have reconfirmed its distrust while watching the process of the U.S.·Iran MOU negotiations,” adding, “It is a structurally very difficult situation for North Korea·U.S. relations to restart.”

On the other hand, there are also clues to resuming North Korea·U.S. dialogue. There is a view that President Trump's interest in chalking up a diplomatic achievement before the midterm elections in November and Chairman Kim's situation of chronic economic woes could dovetail on the occasion of the Asia·Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit scheduled for November. Last month, while the MOU negotiations were in full swing, President Trump posted on social media a photo taken with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during their 2018 Singapore summit.

Cho, the research fellow, said, “After watching the U.S.·Iran war, North Korea likely thought that ‘it would be fully possible to negotiate by using the Achilles heel of the United States,’” adding, “One could also say that the conditions for North Korea·U.S. talks to begin have improved.”

However, concerns are being raised that South Korea's position could shrink further. The common assessment among experts is that far from leading North Korea·U.S. negotiations, South Korea does not even have much room to be involved. In a multilayered crisis structure, a one-track approach trapped in the ‘denuclearization frame’ cannot expand room for maneuver, critics say. Jeon Seong-hun, a guest research fellow at the Sejong Institute, wrote in a report on the 26th of last month, “It was the Trump administration that signed an MOU that unreservedly infringes even on the national interests of Israel, an ally that fought two wars together,” adding, “No one can guarantee that we will not suffer something similar.”