It’s hard breaking up with Washington: Why Canada’s European defense turn has limits
Canada and Europe both want an insurance policy against Donald Trump — and they are turning to defense partnerships to do so.
The military and industrial relationship between Ottawa and Europeans is accelerating, driven by the U.S. president's repeated threats to annex Canada and his undermining of the traditional American commitment to European security.
But European officials, diplomats and analysts who spoke to POLITICO describe a welcome with conditions. Neither side, for one thing, wants a total rupture with Washington, highlighting how delicate reshuffling alliances can be.
Ottawa is “in a phase of constrained rapprochement [with Europe], but they don’t want to completely break away from the U.S.,” said Camille Grand, a former NATO assistant secretary-general who now leads the Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association of Europe.
Later this week, the leaders of the European Union and Canada will meet in Montreal for a summit to deepen their cooperation, including on critical raw materials and defense.
Over the past year, Ottawa has been admitted to the EU’s €150 billion Security Action for Europe loans-for-weapons scheme. It has applied to join a U.K.-led northern European military coalition, although not all existing members are on board. Canada has also selected a German submarine-maker and a Swedish early-warning plane for two of its largest military hardware purchases.
Canada is a natural partner for northern European countries on Arctic security. Asked how closely Canada should be integrated into Europe’s defense policy, Norway’s Defense Minister Tore O. Sandvik replied: “Very. It’s an Arctic nation, a G7 country and a formidable economy.”
Canada is not starting from scratch. It is a founding member of NATO, leads the alliance's Multinational Brigade in Latvia and Canadian aircraft maker Bombardier works closely with European aerospace firms like Saab.
For Europe, Canada is “an easy partner in a way that some of the other countries are not” because Australia, Japan and South Korea are further away and Turkey poses political problems, said Anand Sundar, special adviser to the director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. “A lot is happening outside of the EU. As NATO tries to become more Europeanized, the question is how to do that without leaving Canada out.”
Amid warnings that Russia could attack NATO by 2030, Canada has critical raw materials crucial to Europe’s arms-makers, know-how in Arctic warfare and decades-long continental air defense expertise.
Canada’s International Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu reinforced the need for deeper cooperation at a meeting with EU counterparts last week in Dublin.
“Some of those shared opportunities we're seeking here in Europe is on supply chains, critical mineral supply chains,” he said. “Canada is also working our way up in terms of defense spending, but we can't do it alone. And this is why we want to build up more capacity with our European partners.”
Canada’s access to the SAFE scheme doesn’t mean all new EU defense instruments are now automatically open to Ottawa.
Attention has now shifted to negotiations on the EU’s seven-year budget, and whether third countries will be eligible for some of the €131 billion defense and space program proposed by the European Commission.
Countries such as Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland are open to broader participation, while France, Greece and others want to favor European companies. In late October, the European Parliament also signaled that it was open to letting third nations in, under some conditions, according to internal documents obtained by POLITICO.
EU budget negotiations “are where the depth of Canada’s integration in defense schemes will be decided. It’s an ongoing debate and … it’s up in the air until the very last minute,” said Sundar.
The idea of opening access to the European Competitiveness Fund’s defense money “is more aimed at Canada and the U.K.” than the U.S., added one diplomat. They argued that the requirement that third countries contribute financially to take part makes Washington less likely to participate.
Although Canada struck a deal to take part in SAFE-financed procurements almost a year ago, only one small deal has been announced — a C$10 million contract to supply tactical radios to Poland. Canadian Defence Minister David McGuinty is, however, optimistic that there will be “more to come.”
For now, the deepening Canada-Europe defense cooperation is mostly illustrated by bilateral agreements between Ottawa and European capitals. This summer, the Canadian government chose German shipbuilder TKMS over South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean to build a new fleet of 12 non-nuclear submarines.
The submarine deal, which has yet to be officially signed, is "bringing us very much closer together,” said Norway’s Sandvik.
A major test of Canada’s willingness to pivot away from the U.S. toward Europe will be Canada’s choice between U.S.-made F-35 fighter jets and Sweden’s Gripen E.
Canada is replacing its aging fleet of CF-18 fighters. It planned to buy 88 F-35s and has committed to 16; the remaining 72 are under review by Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government, potentially snubbing Lockheed Martin in favor of Saab.
Asked repeatedly about its status, McGuinty always gives the same answer: “under review.” In July, Ottawa also became an observer to the Global Combat Air Programme, the British-Italian-Japanese effort to build a sixth-generation fighter jet.
Buying Swedish warplanes would anger the Trump administration when trade relations are already under strain; Canada’s economic ties to the U.S. are much larger than its ties with the EU.
Earlier this year, U.S. Ambassador to Canada Pete Hoekstra specifically warned that procuring Swedish aircraft instead of the remaining F-35s would have consequences for the North American Aerospace Defense Command, the military organization through which the U.S. and Canada jointly defend North American airspace.
“NORAD, the most important element of Canada’s defense, isn’t part of NATO but bilateral with the U.S., which explains part of the constraint,” Grand said.
McGuinty did not agree to an interview for this article.
Another test for European governments is whether Canada’s application to join the U.K.-led Joint Expeditionary Force will be accepted — and so far, not everyone is on board.
The U.K.-led force includes the three Baltic states, five Nordic countries and the Netherlands.
Last month, Carney formally applied to join. But while some members, such as Norway, are very open to adding Canada, others are more reluctant.
“Canada is a fellow NATO member; defense relations should remain in NATO. Russia is a threat in the north so it makes sense that they collaborate more with Europe — but within NATO,” said a diplomat from a Baltic country.
Given the Trump administration’s unpredictability, JEF is seen as an additional layer of defense insurance. It’s described by the U.K. as a “first responder” ahead of NATO.
The group’s structures are less clear-cut than NATO’s, but another official from a JEF nation noted that, despite Britain’s role as the grouping's leader, the application would require agreement among all members.
At a meeting in Iceland earlier this month, JEF defense ministers only “noted” Canada’s application, according to a joint statement. A spokesperson for the U.K. Ministry of Defence said London was “consulting” JEF countries on the way forward. A decision could come at a leaders’ summit hosted by Iceland next spring.
Ottawa joining, two diplomats from JEF nations said, could shift the organization’s primary geographical focus from the Baltic Sea to the Arctic. One of them added that it may send a bad signal if Canada were accepted over European nations.
“It would make sense geographically to include Canada in JEF, but then why not Poland and Germany? They are Baltic Sea countries,” the Baltic diplomat echoed.
In Canada, however, the case for a European role goes beyond any one forum. “In both world wars, Canada was involved in Europe years before the U.S. got involved,” said Wendy Gilmour, a former NATO assistant secretary-general who’s now vice chair of the CDA Institute, a Canadian think tank.
She added: “I can envisage situations where Canada engages where the U.S. may not.”
Laura Kayali reported from Paris and Warsaw, Mike Blanchfield from Ottawa, Jacopo Barigazzi from Brussels and Mason Boycott-Owen from London.