Nicolas Baverez: “Spain, From Migration Crisis to Political Crisis” - Le Figaro

Pour sauvegarder un article vous devez être connecté, vous pourrez ainsi les consulter sur tous vos appareils.

After eight years in power, Spanish government’s disastrous handling of the Ceuta migrant wave could well be the last straw for Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez.

More than 200 demonstrations took place across Spain on September 2, drawing crowds of 100,000 to 150,000 people in Madrid, and 25,000 in Valencia, Seville and Zaragoza. Protesters called for the defense of Spanish sovereignty over the North African enclave of Ceuta, as well as Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s resignation and early parliamentary elections.

The migration crisis triggered by the influx of 72,000 migrants into Ceuta on July 30 and 31 turned into a humanitarian and security crisis. Approximately 10,000 migrants, including 1,200 minors, remain in the 18.5 square kilometer (7.1 square mile) enclave, while Madrid has left Ceuta’s 80,000 residents to fend for themselves. The humanitarian and security crisis then became a political crisis due to the prime minister’s carelessness; Sánchez did not change his vacation plans to the Canary Islands and Andorra, and merely converted public facilities in Ceuta into shelters. The political crisis has escalated into an international crisis.

Within the European Union, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, backed by Denmark and Finland, called to suspend or even exclude Spain from the Schengen Area. On the global stage, Sánchez blamed, without evidence, Russia, Israel and the “international far right” for the crisis. To further fan the flames, Sánchez proposed that King Felipe VI visit the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, even though the last visit, by Juan Carlos I in November 2007, had led to intense and lasting diplomatic tensions with Morocco.

The disastrous handling of the Ceuta migrant wave could well be the last straw for Sánchez, who has so far demonstrated exceptional political skill. Living on borrowed time since 2018, this political tightrope walker has defied the odds and remained in power — despite a string of electoral defeats, the lack of a parliamentary majority, and the inability to pass a budget for the past three years. Despite mounting corruption scandals involving his wife, Begoña Gómez — who has been charged with corruption and influence peddling — his brother, his close associates — including former Transportation Minister José Luis Ábalos and his advisor Koldo García — and his Socialist predecessor as head of government, José Luis Zapatero. To do so, he has played on his opponents’ divisions and lack of charisma, as well as fears of a Francoist resurgence, fueled by the rise of Vox.

Sánchez also draws on a strong economic record, highlighting the impressive “remontada” (comeback) since the 2008 crash, Spain’s real estate crisis and the euro crisis. A far cry from the “PIGS” stigma at the time of the euro’s creation, Spain has not only weathered the COVID-19 pandemic but has since established itself as the driving force of the eurozone, with growth of 3.5% in 2024 and 2.8% in 2025 and 2026. The unemployment rate has been cut to 10.3% thanks to the creation of 500,000 jobs per year since 2021. Finally, even though the country has been without a budget for three years, the public deficit has been reduced to 2.4% and public debt to 100.6% of GDP, leading to an upgrade in its credit rating. Spain currently borrows at a 10-year rate of 3.7%, compared to 4.25% for France.

To ensure the survival of his coalition government, which includes the far left, Sánchez has balanced his business-friendly economic policies with resolutely progressive political stances. He took an opposing stance to that of developed countries and the European Union on immigration, increasing the number of visas tenfold between 2017 and 2024 before announcing in 2026 a plan to regularize the status of 500,000 undocumented immigrants — a move that led to more than 1 million applications — explaining the influx of migrants to the Canary Islands and Ceuta.

He has questioned the legacy of the democratic transition, sparking a cultural and historical conflict over the Spanish Civil War and the Franco regime. At the NATO summit in The Hague, he was the only one to challenge the goal of raising defense and security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. He has positioned himself as the foremost opponent of U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, denouncing the illegality of the attack on Iran, closing Spanish airspace to U.S. military aircraft, and supporting Chinese mediation in the Middle East.

This delicate balancing act, driven entirely by domestic politics, was reaching its limits before the Ceuta crisis hit head-on. First, the Spanish economy has not escaped the deteriorating economic environment linked to growing protectionism, the energy crisis, and rising interest rates triggered by the war in Iran. Above all, Spain’s economic and social model is proving unsustainable. Growth is driven by consumption, financed by public debt: It has risen by €430 billion since 2019, compared with €330 billion for GDP. Furthermore, the ambitious social agenda has been made compatible with economic growth only through funding from the Next Generation EU plan, which ends this year.

The end of this European windfall and the worsening economic climate are thus highlighting Spain’s structural problems: stagnant per capita wealth, which is €10,680 below the eurozone average; persistently low productivity due to insufficient investment and innovation; rising job insecurity in the labor market; and the fragilization of the electricity grid due to the prioritization of renewable energy — which led to the blackout across the Iberian Peninsula on April 28, 2025. The strategy of relying on mass immigration to boost economic growth and sustain the informal economy — which accounts for more than 20% of GDP — carries high risks that have played out in Ceuta. This marks a historic shift for Spain, traditionally a country of emigration, which, as of January 1, 2026, had 10 million foreigners on its soil, or 20.1% of the population (49.7 million), compared to less than 1% in 1995. The result has been rising tensions and violence, which erupted in Ceuta.

The “Spanish miracle” is thus largely an illusion. Sánchez’s tactical virtuosity is undermined by his lack of strategy. He holds power more than he exercises amid a period of historic upheaval that is eminently dangerous for both his country and Europe. By throwing open his country’s borders to immigration — even though Spain is one of the main gateways to Europe — he is undermining the EU’s efforts to redefine its migration policy, destabilizing the Schengen Area, and unleashing the far right across the entire continent. A far right that, in Spain as in France, is above all the product of the degeneration of socialism — a socialism that has betrayed its values, history and voters.