“Only the U.S.? An era of exploiting chokepoints”…Iran closing Hormuz, North Korea seeking to slip free of sanctions - 경향신문

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Vessels gather in the Strait of Hormuz near the Gulf of Oman on the 20th. Xinhua News Agency·Yonhap News

At its narrowest, the Strait of Hormuz is only 40 km wide, yet it is a key passage through which about 30% of the world’s seaborne crude flows. After Iran, following clashes with the United States, shut the strait, South Korea also suffered major disruption in oil supplies. More than 2,000 vessels detained inside the strait and the resulting rise in global oil prices served as a powerful bargaining lever for Iran.

The term chokepoint (Chokepoint), meaning a strategic strongpoint, bottleneck, or vital node, has drawn global attention recently due to Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz. Was Iran’s weaponization of the strait entirely unforeseeable? Edward Fishman, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and author of <What Do States Fight With?>, said, “Concerns that Iran would shut the Strait of Hormuz if war broke out already existed during the Barack Obama administration.”

He added, however, “What has changed is that Iran has learned to selectively shut the strait, for example by using drones and anti-ship missiles to target specific vessels.” In fact, the Korean vessel Namu, which had been isolated inside the strait, was struck twice on the 4th of last month by anti-ship missiles believed to be of Iranian origin.

The original English title of Edward Fishman’s <What Do States Fight With?> is Chokepoints. He judges that a chokepoint’s conditions are met where a particular country holds dominant control and it is difficult to find substitutes in the short term, as with the Strait of Hormuz.

Translated and published domestically in March this year, the book traces the history of U.S. economic sanctions against Iran, China, and Russia. The United States has leveraged its hegemonic status and the dollar as the key reserve currency, and since the 2000s has imposed economic sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and others pursuing nuclear weapons. The strategy was to cut off the flow of funds to governments.

We conducted a written email interview with Fishman, who served at the State Department and the Treasury Department under the Obama administration, starting early this month. He said, “President Donald Trump started a war with Iran, yet the result is that Iran now holds the most important energy chokepoint in the world,” adding, “While the sanctions architecture is weakening, the number of middle powers exploiting chokepoints is actually increasing.” The following is a Q&A.

Edward Fishman, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Provided by the subject

-Why have chokepoints drawn attention?

“We are in an era of economic war in which sanctions, tariffs, and export controls have become core tools of great-power competition. Over the past 20 years, this war has spread rapidly because countries learned how to weaponize bottlenecks.”

-Iran used the Strait of Hormuz as a chokepoint.

“The United States focused on isolating Iran from the international financial system and using the dollar to reduce revenue from Iran’s oil exports. In the past, Iran lacked the capacity to retaliate economically, but this war was different. It shut the Strait of Hormuz and retaliated by targeting only a few dozen ships with drones and missiles. It showed that even a middle power like Iran can wage economic war with the United States if it weaponizes a chokepoint.”

-Was such an approach possible before as well?

“Even under the Obama administration there were worries that, if war broke out, Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz. At the time the assumption was a naval blockade using sea mines, and mines attack both friend and foe, so it was seen as limited in use. This time Iran learned to selectively close the strait using drones and anti-ship missiles. That approach surprised the United States and Israel.”

-There are concerns that attempts to secure national gains by emulating Iran will increase.

“I see a significant risk that several countries will weaponize chokepoints. Last year, China used its control over rare earths to effectively blunt U.S. pressure. Iran is trying to impose transit fees on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz. I think governments will look for ways to weaponize chokepoints while even generating revenue.”

-Are there other countries looking to monetize chokepoints like Iran?

“In Indonesia, the idea of monetizing the Strait of Malacca was publicly raised in April. I think it is a harbinger of what is to come.”

Plastic packaging stacked at a market in Seoul on the 15th. As the closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted oil supplies, supplies of petroleum-based raw materials such as plastics also faced an emergency. Yonhap News

After the Strait of Hormuz came under control, concerns deepened for the South Korean government and companies. They are considering diversifying oil suppliers and identifying and securing alternative energy, but chokepoints are multiplying not only in oil, but also in minerals and financial networks.

-The South Korean government, a major crude importer, also faces a serious dilemma.

“The energy supply crisis will not end for the time being. Expecting the Strait of Hormuz to revert to an open waterway as before the U.S.Iran war is unrealistic. Countries that rely on imports of fossil fuels must think seriously about how to ensure energy security.”

-Neighboring countries also seem to need countermeasures.

“There is a broader trend in which states, seeing neighbors weaponize chokepoints, take steps to protect themselves. The global rise of government-led industrial policy can be understood as an effort to defend against influence other countries can exert on one’s own economy.”

-Alternatives to Iran moving this way are also likely to appear.

“Within the next 10 years, Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar are likely to move to export more oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) without going through the Strait of Hormuz. They appear set to export oil by building various types of infrastructure and pipelines.”

-Experts cite diversification of crude sources and adoption of alternative energy as options.

“Many countries will accelerate the adoption of alternatives such as battery-centric electric vehicles and solar panels. Yet China holds a 7090% market share in related industries. The chokepoint could shift from the Strait of Hormuz to factories in China.”

Kim Jong Un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea, and Chinese President Xi Jinping pose for a commemorative photo during their summit in Beijing on the 8th. Korean Central News Agency·Yonhap News

Moves to escape chokepoints can also be seen in North Korea. Subject to U.S. economic sanctions, North Korea has recently tightened alignment with China and Russia to gain economic benefits and try to escape the shock of sanctions. President Lee Jae Myung said at a briefing on the results of his Europe·Group of Seven (G7) tour on the 19th that he told President Trump, “Sanctions and pressure are ineffective. As Russia and North Korea cooperate militarily due to the war in Ukraine, the effectiveness of sanctions has declined.”

-At the U.S.China summit last month, Chinese President Xi Jinping was assessed to have stood on equal footing with President Trump.

“Last year, China fundamentally changed the landscape by controlling exports of rare earths. President Trump thought that, because the volume the United States imports from China far exceeds the volume it exports to China, imposing tariffs would win the trade war. But China showed it can retaliate not only with tariffs but also through export controls on rare earths and the like. It demonstrated that this is not a simple trade war but a multi-domain economic war.”

-China is getting closer to countries targeted by U.S. sanctions.

“China has played a role in undermining the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. You can see this in Venezuela under the Maduro regime, in Iran, in Russia, and now in North Korea. China is trying to build a different form of influence by cultivating a reputation for buttressing the economies of states the United States seeks to isolate.”

-Some predict that as North Korea tightens ties with China and Russia, it will fear U.S.-led economic sanctions less.

“The sanctions regime has weakened over the years. As it wages war against Ukraine, Russia is openly relying on North Korea for weapons and military capability. North Korea has found a new economic lifeline by selling weapons to Russia and dispatching personnel. It is converting geopolitical friction into revenue and influence.”

-This suggests that using economic sanctions as a chokepoint can be neutralized if multiple countries do not cooperate.

“North Korea is becoming useful to states that stand opposite the United States. China does not want the United States to exercise influence in Northeast Asia and shape the region’s security order, and that gives North Korea more room to maneuver than before. If Russia and China are willing to provide North Korea with economic and political support, sanctions alone will struggle to compel strategic change in Pyongyang’s behavior. The effectiveness of economic sanctions will depend on enforcement and on geopolitical alignment.”