[OPINION] 2026 BARMM parliamentary elections under the shadow of resurgent extremism - Rappler

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On Monday, September 14, nearly 2.4 million voters across the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) will cast their ballots in the region’s first parliamentary elections, a milestone that represents the culmination of decades of armed struggle and peace negotiations.

The election, originally scheduled for May 2022 but postponed four times due to legal, technical, and political complications, marks the transition from an appointed transitional authority to a democratically elected government.

It is a cornerstone of the political track under the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), signed by the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 2014. 

Yet as Bangsamoro communities prepare for this historic moment, the region finds itself gripped by a signaling resurgence of violent extremism.

Recent data from Conflict Climate Action shows a troubling picture: violent incidents linked to extremist groups have nearly doubled, rising 91% to 44 cases in 2025 from 23 a year earlier.

These are not isolated encounters. They are part of a persistent pattern that poses an imminent threat to the legitimacy of the peace process and the democratic transition it promises.

The evidence of resurgent extremism is stark and multifaceted. In 2026 alone, military operations in Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao have killed 10 members of Dawlah Islamiyah-Maute, the ISIS-affiliated group responsible for the 2017 Marawi siege and numerous attacks since. These operations follow similar deadly encounters in Lanao del Norte in 2024 and 2025, demonstrating a persistent and adaptive threat. 

However, the military claims extremist groups have been largely neutralized, while large-scale attacks like the Marawi Siege have been prevented; sporadic but organized violence continues to plague the region. 

This escalation must be seen within a longer trajectory. The 2017 Marawi siege, carried out by the ISIS-affiliated Maute group, was the longest urban conflict in the Philippines, devastating the city and displacing more than 350,000 individuals. Nine years later, post-reconstruction remains a predicament for internally displaced people who continue to live with insecurities in transitory shelters with no definitive timeline for their return. Another indication of the threat came in December 2023, when an explosion during a Catholic Mass at Mindanao State University-Marawi killed four people and injured 42. Authorities identified DI-Maute as the primary suspect.

These encounters make clear that they continue to pose an active threat across the Mindanao region as they adapt their tactics, using online channels to recruit local Moros, while remaining operationally and ideologically linked to the foreign-led Islamic State. This digital dimension of extremism makes the threat more diffuse and harder to counter through traditional military means.

The extremist threat in Bangsamoro is not purely domestic. Even after the Marawi Siege, more than 100 foreign terrorist fighters  continued traveling to the Philippines to sustain conflicts across Mindanao, as the region is seen as a hub for transnational extremist networks.  This is not new. Since the Al Qaeda days, the Philippines has been regarded as a “terrorism academy” in Asia, where its archipelagic setting, porous maritime borders, and historical militant groups provide a conducive environment for training activities. The ease of movement across the island chain and weak coastal surveillance have long made it easier for foreign fighters to embed themselves within local extremist groups. 

The resurgence of extremism coincides with the first Bangsamoro election and threatens to undermine it.

Security preparations have been extensive: a gun ban took effect on July 16, 2026, and will last until September 29, 2026.  By August 24, at least 15 people had been arrested for violating the ban, while 20 firearms had been seized. More than 24,000 security checkpoints have been established across the region, with approximately 30,000 security personnel deployed to ensure peaceful elections. 

Despite these measures, election-related violence has already occurred. On August 14, a convoy carrying interim BARMM Chief Minister Macacua was fired upon by unidentified assailants in Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao del Norte, as he returned from assuming leadership of the Bangsamoro Federalist Party. While no injuries were recorded, the attack on such a high-profile figure underscores the volatile security environment.

The COMELEC has identified 105 municipalities and three cities for checkpoint implementation to enforce the gun ban. The concentration of security concerns in these areas reflects the persistent influence of armed groups and political dynasties that have historically used violence to influence electoral outcomes. 

The resurgence of extremism cannot be understood in isolation from the broader fragility of the Bangsamoro peace process. The creation of the BARMM through the CAB was intended to address historical injustices against the Bangsamoro people and provide a political solution to decades of armed conflict.

Yet after eight years, the accord faces compounding threats that erode its implementation and legitimacy.

The normalization process — the critical component of the peace agreement that includes decommissioning of MILF combatants, transformation of camps, and the delivery of socioeconomic packages — remains in a state of suspension. In July 2025, the MILF Central Committee resolved to halt the decommissioning of its remaining 14,000 combatants and 2,450 weapons, citing the government’s failure to deliver “substantially on its socioeconomic commitments”. 

This deadlock in normalization has profound implications for the election and the region’s future. Combatants who remain armed and without viable livelihoods represent a pool of potential recruits for extremist groups that offer alternative narratives of resistance and identity (Crisis Group, 2026). The MILF’s inability to deliver on its promises to its own fighters undermines its credibility and creates openings for more radical actors to fill the void.

Political divisions within the MILF have further complicated the landscape. The United Bangsamoro Justice Party, led by MILF senior leaders, now competes against the Bangsamoro Federalist Party, which draws support from former MILF commanders and established regional politicians. This intra-MILF competition has transformed the movement’s internal dynamics and potentially weakened its ability to present a unified front against extremist threats. 

Extremist groups do not merely exploit failures in the peace process; they arise from structural gaps that it has yet to address. While political and socio-economic reforms continue, stability remains uneven after seven years of transition. Poverty rates are dropping, yet the region still has the country’s highest illiteracy rate, and development remains sluggish. Factionalism and dynastic politics remain embedded in political life in the region.  The clan feuds across the region, conflicts that have claimed lives and forced families from their homes.

These horizontal conflicts create environments where extremist groups can thrive, offering protection, identity, and purpose to youth who see no future within existing political structures. The Marawi rehabilitation process exemplifies these structural challenges. Nine years after the siege, post-reconstruction remains a predicament for internally displaced persons who continue to live with insecurities in transitory shelters with no definitive timeline for return.

The efforts to prevent violent extremism in Mindanao became a government priority after the Marawi siege. Yet, these programs remain insufficient in scale, with poor interagency coordination, duplication, and uneven evaluation.  Hard security measures sometimes backfire due to overly broad definitions of extremism, risk securitizing communities, and narrow civic space, blurring the line between protection and surveillance. 

The convergence of the first Bangsamoro election with the resurgence of extremism creates a critical juncture for the region. The election represents more than a political transition; it is a test of whether the peace process can deliver tangible improvements in governance, security, and livelihoods. If the election proceeds peacefully and results in a government perceived as legitimate and effective, it could strengthen the peace process and undercut extremist narratives. Conversely, if the election is marred by violence, fraud, or perceived illegitimacy, it could validate extremist claims that democratic politics cannot address Bangsamoro grievances. 

The challenge now is mitigating escalating threats that could lead to another bold extremist attack, not merely another humanitarian crisis, but a terminal blow to the peace process’s legitimacy. Authorities must recognize that counterterrorism alone is insufficient and often counterproductive; military operations without a peace dividend risk producing othering that sustains extremism.

In this volatile context, the central government, MILF, and other stakeholders must act decisively and in coordination. This means returning to comprehensive agreement commitments, accelerating normalization with a clear timeline, the election proceeds without further delay, and fast-tracking the socio-economic package for reintegration to restore political and moral legitimacy. The MILF must consolidate and recalibrate its forces and resist relapse to armed struggle. 

The extremism in Mindanao is not merely a symptom of peace process failures; it is an alternative that feeds on them. If authorities continue framing the situation as “under control” through hard security while disregarding these signals, and MILF leaders remain consumed by frictions, these groups will only expand and grow more relevant, waiting for the next wind to fan them into flame.

The September 14 election is not just a vote; it is a referendum on whether peace through political inclusion can prevail over violence through extremist exclusion. The future of Bangsamoro hangs in the balance. – Rappler.com

Reemar B Alonsagay is Faculty Member at the Political Studies Department of Mindanao State University Main Campus. He holds a Masters in Applied Conflict Transformation Studies from the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies in Cambodia.