Tackling terror: need to shift from reactive to proactive gear

The daredevil suicide attack using an explosives-laden vehicle, followed by armed militants storming the police lines and the adjacent Special Branch building, demonstrates the intensity of the terrorist threat confronting Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Thirty-one people, including 17 police personnel, were martyred and around 100 were injured. The police and army personnel put up a brave fight, ultimately killing the attackers. The incident, however, brings to the fore a larger question: why do militant organisations continue to retain the capacity to plan, recruit, equip and execute complex attacks? This cannot be treated as an isolated incident. On July 15, militants attempted to storm the Miryan Police Station in Bannu with an explosives-laden vehicle, followed by an armed assault that resulted in the martyrdom of a police official and injuries to several security personnel and civilians. On July 24, a joint security checkpost came under attack in Tank, where militants rammed an explosives-laden vehicle into its perimeter, martyring 15 people - including 12 soldiers, two policemen and a former Forest Department official. On July 29, a group of militants carried out an attack against the Khazina Banda police checkpost in Hangu, resulting in the martyrdom of nine policemen, including a deputy superintendent of police, and injuries to 28 others. On August 2, a suicide bomber detonated near the Kabal Police Station in Swat while a public protest against lawlessness was under way, claiming the lives of 17 people, including seven policemen. Security forces, including the police and military, continue to discharge their duties with unflinching commitment, with many making the ultimate sacrifice. But security policy cannot be measured merely by heroism at the point of attack. The most pressing question is whether killing terrorists after they strike is enough to break the cycle of militancy. Tactical history shows that while terrorists are killed, hideouts dismantled and key commanders eliminated, these successes are often short-lived. After a brief lull, subsequent attacks emerge - frequently proving more organised, sophisticated and destructive. While responding to and neutralising an active assault is an essential pillar of counterterrorism, a purely reactive strategy is not a permanent solution. The government must be mindful of how this organizational machinery operates. How do they recruit? How do they influence young people with extremist narratives? Who radicalises them? How do they maintain their command-and-control systems? Where do their recruits receive training? Who provides weapons, explosives, transport, safe houses and reconnaissance? How are they financed? Who acts as a facilitator, courier, informer or propagandist? Without answering these questions and getting to the bottom of the problem, the counterterrorism apparatus will continue to spin in a vicious cycle. Counterterrorism in essence is an intelligence-led enterprise. The overall aim should not be merely to kill the attacker after he reaches the gate of a police station or some checkpost, but to identify and intercept him before he departs from his hideout. That however is not possible without a well-knit intelligence network involving the police, Counter Terrorism Department, Special Branch, Intelligence Bureau and other relevant agencies. Information about militant movement, recruitment, financing, communication, weapons procurement, facilitation and operational planning must be collected, collated, analysed and implemented into preventive action. Advance knowledge is the key to success. A terrorist does not appear out of the blue and function in a vacuum. Such groups draw strength from an ecosystem of recruits, financiers, facilitators, couriers, safe houses, weapons suppliers, intelligence collectors, ideological sympathisers and propaganda networks. Destruction of one cell does not suffice. The gaps require attention. The listed gaps include inadequate human intelligence in affected localities; weak investigation and forensic follow-up; insufficient penetration of militant support networks; failure to disrupt weapons, explosives and logistical supply chains; limited expertise in terrorist financing; and weaknesses in converting raw intelligence into preventive action. Reports from both international and national agencies consistently highlight cross-border facilitation as a critical dimension of Pakistan's security challenges. Islamabad is on record stating that Afghan authorities allow TTP elements to operate from their soil, though Kabul denies the charge. Yet, attributing domestic militancy entirely to external factors oversimplifies a highly complex problem. The fundamental question remains: what internal vulnerabilities enable these militants to operate inside Pakistan? Basing the entire strategy on the assumption of external support may not be a comprehensive approach unless those external sources are linked to local networks - including local enablers, recruiters, financiers, facilitators, informants, and propaganda machinery. Counterterrorism measures, therefore, must be based on an unsentimental examination of the internal social and logistical space available to militancy. Many of the troubled localities also suffer from structural flaws caused by applying the exact same policing model to regions facing radically different levels of threat. Bannu is not Abbottabad. Lakki Marwat is not Haripur. Tank is not Chitral. Consequently, North Waziristan cannot be policed on the same threat assumptions as a relatively peaceful district. Police strength, CTD presence, intelligence resources, armoured protection, surveillance capability, investigation units, specialised weapons and rapid-response capacity should be measured in accordance with the threat, terrain, population, militant capability and vulnerability of installations. A region facing suicide bombers, IEDs, automatic weapons and drones requires a very different security framework than others. The current situation demands a shift from a reactive mode to a proactive one. While protecting vital installations remains essential, the initiative must not be left to the adversary. The writ of the state is not measured by how forcefully it responds after citizens and policemen have been killed. It is measured by whether the state possesses the intelligence, institutional capacity and legitimacy to prevent those deaths in the first place. K-P has paid too heavy a price in blood - for how much longer must it continue to pay? It is high time the state fought with its full might, seizing the initiative to uproot terrorism in all its forms.