The meeting that could mark the end of the world as we know it - The Telegraph

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Donald Trump greets China and Russia’s ‘strongmen’ leaders in Shenzhen on Wednesday Credit: Reuters/Iori Sagisawa Adrian Blomfield Senior Foreign Correspondent, aboard the JS Ise in the Western Pacific Show biography Adrian covers defence, politics and conflict across the globe. ...

Donald Trump greets China and Russia’s ‘strongmen’ leaders in Shenzhen on Wednesday Credit: Reuters/Iori Sagisawa Adrian Blomfield Senior Foreign Correspondent, aboard the JS Ise in the Western Pacific Show biography Adrian covers defence, politics and conflict across the globe. He has previously worked from Nairobi, Baghdad, Moscow and Jerusalem

Skimming across the waves of the Western Pacific, the US rigid-hull inflatable closing in on the Japanese warship is a reassuring symbol of the old order.

Donald Trump may have shown withering disdain for traditional allies from Japan to Europe, but here, in the waters off Sagami Bay, things feel much as they have for decades.

Clambering up a ladder lowered by the sailors of the JS Ise, the members of the five-strong US boarding party grin at their Japanese counterparts, before embarking on a scripted exercise designed to mimic the forced inspection of a suspect vessel at sea.

Somewhere to the Ise’s starboard, Australian and Indian sailors are participating in a similar drill. It is one of a series of exercises bringing together the four members of the Quad, an informal partnership designed largely to counter China.

US navy troops prepare to board JS Ise, a Japanese self-defence forces ship, in the Pacific during joint exercises Credit: Eduardo Soteras for The Telegraph For Washington’s traditional security establishment, the Quad and other partnerships like it – Nato or the Aukus pact with Britain and Australia – embody a once-cherished doctrine that holds that the US is strongest when acting as the lynchpin of a global alliance of like-minded powers.

Such certainties no longer seem to apply.

On Thursday, Mr Trump will further shake the postwar dispensation when he meets Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of a summit for Asia-Pacific countries in Shenzhen, China.

The US president has long been accused of cosseting foreign strongmen. Now he appears to be embracing the foremost among them. Little wonder that unease has gripped Washington’s traditional allies and partners in Europe, Asia and beyond.

Members of the Royal Australian Navy and the Japanese self-defence forces during the Malabar exercises in the Pacific earlier this month Credit: Eduardo Soteras for The Telegraph Eastern European leaders have been particularly vocal, with Volodymyr Zelensky and Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s foreign minister, warning against a reprise of the Yalta Conference of 1945.

The comparisons, many analysts argue, are overblown. At Yalta, Winston Churchill and Franklin D Roosevelt effectively conceded Stalin’s demand for Soviet domination of eastern Europe, consigning millions to decades of Communist rule.

Nothing of comparable substance is expected this time. The present-day reincarnation of the Big Three has not even managed to agree an agenda in advance, let alone a grand plan for the future of Europe. Some have dismissed the encounter as little more than a photo opportunity.

Yet what a photograph. An image of the leader of the free world sitting down with the foremost opponents of that world could become the defining picture of Mr Trump’s foreign policy legacy.

A woman takes a selfie in front of an artwork in Yalta, Crimea, showing Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin Credit: Reuters/Alexey Pavlishak If, as some analysts argue, the postwar rules-based order is giving way to a revival of great-power politics, history books may one day regard it as the moment one geopolitical era gave way to another.

As Mr Zelensky has noted, the fear is less the summit itself than the precedent it sets.

Shenzhen may produce no earth-shattering agreement, but it would break a taboo, making further such encounters more likely and potentially paving the way for a grand bargain between Mr Trump and Putin over Europe’s security architecture.

Jonathan Czin, of the Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think tank, concedes that this is a worst-case scenario and perhaps unlikely. He warns: “Although this meeting will be more photo op than substance, like the original Yalta meeting it could pave the way for the carving up of eastern Europe to accommodate Russian interests.”

Donald Trump and Xi Jinping walk side by side at Shenzhen Bao’an airport on Wednesday Credit: Getty/Win McNamee A grand reconfiguration of the geopolitical order may nevertheless prove difficult to achieve, says John Lough of the New Eurasian Strategies Centre. The world today is vastly different from that of 1945, making any attempt to divide it neatly into spheres of influence hard to realise.

Mr Czin said: “All three powers fundamentally understand – although Russia to a lesser extent than the others – that the game has moved on. And much as Russia in particular has this nostalgia for 19th-century-style diplomacy, redrawing maps and telling small countries what to do, the reality is they can’t do that any more.”

However, Mr Trump and Putin, have reasons to want a grand bargain.

Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping greet one another with a handshake in Shenzhen on Wednesday Credit: Getty/Sergei Bobylyov The US president has transactional instincts, a fondness for dramatic gestures and a desire to make history – one likely to have deepened after the humiliating rebuff voters dealt the Republican Party in the midterm elections.

Unlike his predecessors, Mr Trump seems almost to favour the implications of Yalta that great powers should enjoy uncontested spheres of influence.

Given his own ambitions for US hegemony in the Western hemisphere, some European officials fear he could be prepared to countenance Chinese dominance over the South China Sea and Taiwan, or Russian ascendancy over much of the former Soviet Union.

Scott Moore, also of Brookings, suggests the summit would “signal that Washington is prepared to trade the international order it built after 1945 for a concert of authoritarian-nationalist great powers”.

Winston Churchill, Franklin D Roosevelt and Stalin at the highly consequential Yalta Conference on Feb 4 1945 Credit: AP He wrote: “If the summit goes ahead, it will symbolise a once-unthinkable alignment between the United States and the world’s foremost authoritarian powers.”

Certainly, Putin could scarcely be more delighted. Although the Russian leader has little hope of persuading Mr Trump to force an end to the war in Ukraine on his increasingly strident terms immediately, the summit itself represents a triumph he has long sought.

He can tell Russians their country has ended its post-Cold War humiliation and restored its place at the top table in the geopolitical banqueting hall.

That message is already being delivered to Russian television audiences. Alexander Dugin, a nationalist ideologue, has described the Shenzhen meeting as “deeply symbolic”, adding that it is “confirmation of a multi-polar world that the West denies”.

Russian officials, too, have drawn comparisons with Yalta.

Volodymyr Zelensky is seen on a screen addressing the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, watched by Elbridge Colby, the US under secretary of defence for policy Credit: Getty/Omar Havana Vladimir Medinsky, Russia’s chief negotiator, said: “The task is to create a comprehensive system of security in Europe that will become a new modern Yalta. If we manage to create such a security system then we will ensure peace in Europe for decades, perhaps even centuries.”

The Russians may be getting ahead of themselves. Mr Trump still believes he can coax Putin towards a deal on Ukraine, a conviction that some analysts fear is helping to prolong the war.

Mr Lough said: “I still have the impression that Trump thinks he’s just got to be even nicer to Putin and then something will yield and Putin will become more flexible.

“The question then to me is whether the Americans are inadvertently making the Russians even more unreasonable, to the point where they’re actually going to make the war last longer in Ukraine than it might have done, because the Russians think they can still get the biggest possible prize?”

Sanae Takaichi of Japan, India’s Narendra Modi, Donald Trump and Australia’s prime minister Anthony Albanese in Manila on Tuesday Credit: AP/Mark Schiefelbein For European leaders, the prospect that the future, not just of Ukraine but of Europe itself, could be discussed without either having a seat at the table is a nightmare outcome.

Every time Mr Trump meets or speaks with Putin, there is a collective intake of breath across the Continent. An encounter involving Mr Xi as well has raised the stakes further.

The unease is shared by Washington’s traditional allies in the Indo-Pacific. Several countries that have drawn closer to the US in recent years are already scrambling to recalibrate their relations with Beijing, as the two presidents move towards warmer relations.

The Philippines is one such country. Its president, Ferdinand Marcos Jr has tilted away from Beijing towards Washington, leading to a series of tense encounters between Filipino and Chinese vessels in the South China Sea, where the two countries have competing territorial claims.

Yet Mr Trump has become increasingly reluctant to criticise Chinese actions in the contested region, forcing Mr Marcos Jr to adopt a more conciliatory approach towards Beijing.

Members of the US navy boarding the JS Ise during joint exercises in the Pacific last week Credit: Eduardo Soteras for The Telegraph Analysts warn that Washington’s reluctance to stand up for its allies in Asia will embolden China.

Mr Trump has become increasingly critical of South Korea and Japan, accusing both of failing to support the US-Israeli war on Iran while demanding that Tokyo treble its financial contribution to hosting American bases.

Those bases have played a vital role in allowing the US to project power across the Western Pacific.

Amid fears of abandonment, Washington’s Asian allies say pressure from an increasingly assertive Beijing is growing all the time.

Last week’s Quad exercises off Japan’s Pacific coast involved six warships and a submarine. For six days, the crews rehearsed everything from anti-submarine warfare and ship-to-ship combat to seaborne helicopter operations.

Yet not far away, in the same waters, a far larger fleet gathered with considerably less fanfare. Some 100 Chinese warships, including carrier strike groups, embarked on unannounced manoeuvres in the Western Pacific, conducting drills that included simulated attacks on Taiwan.

One of the largest Chinese naval deployments in recent times elicited no reaction from Washington.

In an apparent attempt to reassure traditional allies, Mr Trump did convene a brief meeting of the Quad this week during his stop in Manila.

The meeting was reportedly arranged at the behest of Marco Rubio, the US secretary of state, who remains a China hawk and has continued to pursue a more orthodox American foreign policy in Asia than his boss.

The gesture is unlikely to dispel fears that Mr Trump could ultimately betray both Nato and Washington’s partners in the Indo-Pacific. If such a betrayal comes, it is unlikely to be completed at Shenzhen. History suggests that geopolitical realignments rarely happen in dramatic, single moments. They are more often the product of a gradual series of shifts and concessions.

That will not stop allies and adversaries alike scrutinising every moment of the summit for signs that Shenzhen marks the beginning of a new era, in which Washington turns its back on old friends and embraces more powerful ones.

With the exercise aboard the JS Ise complete, the US sailors speed back to their ship. The rituals of an alliance system that has underpinned the security of the Pacific for generations remain intact. Military commanders continue to work as closely as ever in its defence.

Yet all this risks counting for little if Mr Trump continues to turn his back on Washington’s traditional allies.

There may be no new Yalta in Shenzhen, and a grand design for a new geopolitical settlement may prove difficult to implement.

What worries European and Asian diplomats, though, is that a US president who has long blurred the distinction between allies and adversaries may now be tilting towards the latter, dismantling the old order without offering any clear idea of what might replace it.

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