Three years of genocide: How has Britain’s policy shifted on Israel? - Anadolu Ajansı

Since October 2023, the trajectory of British foreign policy toward Israel and Palestine has undergone an extraordinary evolution.

What began under Rishi Sunak’s Conservative administration as strong diplomatic and military support for Tel Aviv has transformed into what some experts call one of the most significant pivots in modern British diplomacy.

In the immediate wake of the Oct. 7 attacks, Downing Street pledged absolute support for Israel's right to defend itself. Royal Air Force surveillance aircraft were dispatched over the Eastern Mediterranean and demands for a ceasefire were repeatedly brushed aside in line with Washington’s geopolitical posture.

Yet, over the months that followed, as civilian death tolls mounted, humanitarian access collapsed and concerns over grave violations of international law grew, that consensus fractured.

Since October 2023, Israel's war in Gaza has killed more than 74,000 Palestinians and injured over 175,000 others, according to Palestinian figures, also destroying about 90% of the enclave's infrastructure.

This staggering human loss was accompanied by landmark international legal assessments from UN special committees, human rights organizations and international legal experts warning that Israel's military actions and siege tactics in Gaza breached the threshold of genocide.

The arrival of Prime Minister Andy Burnham and Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband this summer brought a sharper tone to Britain’s policy toward Israel, building on cautious changes introduced under Keir Starmer.

Yet, while ministers present this reset as a moral imperative, some observers question how far it reflects a change in principle and how far it is a response to public pressure, political risk and legal exposure.

At Labour’s recent party conference, Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband addressed those who had protested over the treatment of Palestinians: “We hear you, you were right.”

"Under Andy's leadership, we have reset our approach. We call out ethnic cleansing by the settler terrorists in the West Bank. We call out the evidence of war crimes in Gaza. We call out Israel's illegal occupation of Palestine. And we match words with actions,” he said.

Miliband pledged to ban imports from illegal settlements and disrupt British financial, construction and service-sector support for them.

Under Starmer, Britain resumed funding to the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA, in July 2024, suspended around 30 arms export licenses that September and formally recognized Palestine in September 2025.

His government also dropped plans to challenge the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over Israeli officials.

But Burnham has acknowledged shortcomings in Labour’s earlier response, saying the party “didn’t get it right.”

"The suffering of the Palestinian people is a scar on the conscience of the world. Innocent Palestinians, including children, continue to be killed in Gaza,” he said. “Before I became Prime Minister, I said our country's response had been too slow and simply not good enough."

For Iain Overton, executive director of Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), the sequence shows both the extent of the changes and how slowly they came.

"I think there has been a genuine shift in British policy, but it has been painfully slow and has followed events rather than forged them," he told Anadolu.

For veteran British journalist Peter Oborne, the significance of the change in direction cannot be downplayed.

"The Burnham government has made the most significant change in British policy towards Israel in 50 years," he told Anadolu.

He stressed that this transition was far from cosmetic and “has been backed up by strong language and is deeply resented by Israel."

However, observers noted that this transformation was not forged purely in the quiet halls of diplomatic idealism, but rather in the electoral battlefield.

The Labour Party suffered severe blows among traditional Muslim communities and left-liberal voters angered by initial parliamentary hesitation over Gaza.

Tim Bale, professor of politics at Queen Mary University of London, argued that the policy shift is tied directly to domestic political realities.

“Miliband’s announcement is the product of genuine outrage at the settler violence but does have the benefit too of responding to widespread disillusionment of both Muslim and many non-Muslim left-liberal voters with what they saw as the weak stance on Gaza adopted by Labour under Starmer.”

Bale also said acting alongside other countries had made the tougher position easier to defend.

The UK’s move to ban trade with illegal Israeli settlements came in coordination with France and Canada and meant they joined several other Western nations that had already done the same.

The 2025 recognition of Palestinian statehood was also coordinated with Canada and Australia.

"The fact that the government's hardening of its position was coordinated with other governments has given it a certain amount of cover when it comes to critics,” Bale said.

For Overton, public pressure and the scale of the harm in Gaza were central to the change.

“After Oct. 7, the emphasis was overwhelmingly on Israel’s right to defend itself,” he said. “What followed was an extraordinary and terrible level of civilian harm in Gaza, mounting concerns over international humanitarian law and enormous political and public pressure not to enable Israel.”

He argued that these developments made Britain’s earlier position increasingly difficult to sustain.

“The suspension of some arms licences, recognition of Palestine and measures against illegal settlements are substantive changes and were forged by public outcry. But I would not describe this as a sudden moral awakening in Westminster,” he said.

For Overton, arms exports remain a test of whether Britain’s actions match its stated concerns.

Under the UK’s export licensing criteria, the state is legally prohibited from issuing export licenses if there is a "clear risk" that military technology could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law.

The initial September 2024 suspension was limited. It covered around 30 licenses out of approximately 350, rather than imposing a comprehensive arms embargo.

Affected equipment included drones, naval systems, parts for military aircraft and targeting gear.

The UK government has since expanded curbs, with Stephen Doughty, the UK Middle East minister, saying last month that around 50 more licenses were blocked under a “tighter system.”

However, British-made parts of the F-35 fighter jet supply chain continue to be exempt from the suspension, despite legal challenges.

For Overton, the question is whether the government’s subsequent policy changes are accompanied by further restrictions on military support.

"Policy changed because the political, legal and humanitarian costs of maintaining the previous position became increasingly difficult to defend. Story after story landed on the UK’s complicity,” he said.

He argued that diplomatic recognition and condemnation would have limited effect without changes to the practical relationship.

"Recognition of Palestine matters, but it does not protect civilians from air strikes. Condemnation of air strikes on civilians matters, but it rings hollow if Britain continues materially to enable conduct it says it opposes in the form of military intelligence and selective arms export licence approvals."

Overton said the government’s willingness to accept the consequences of further action would determine how far its policy had changed.

“Yes, the change is real. But the issue is whether the Government is prepared to follow the logic of its own position when doing so carries diplomatic, commercial or strategic costs,” he said. “It seems, at the moment, they want to have their cake and eat it too."