Ukraine Is Losing the War – but Not in the Way the West Thinks
By Sergey Poletaev, information analyst and publicist, co-founder and editor of the Vatfor project.
By Sergey Poletaev, information analyst and publicist, co-founder and editor of the Vatfor project.
© Niall Carson / PA Images via Getty Images Last weekend, US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner visited Moscow and then Kiev. This was the first such visit in a long time, since all trilateral contacts between Russia, the US, and Ukraine were practically halted following the start of the conflict in Iran this February.
Following the visit, leaks regarding the talks emerged from Kiev; reportedly, the US envoys presented the Ukrainian side with a 28-point Russian peace plan that had been agreed upon a year earlier. Jared Kushner indirectly confirmed this on Saturday, stating that the territorial issue was the only point of the peace plan that remained unresolved.
Is it true that Ukraine accepted all the other fundamental demands of the Russian side – such as the points concerning the Russian language and the status of the Orthodox Church, the renunciation of military cooperation with NATO, the recognition of territorial changes, the reduction of the army, and so on? (Spoiler: no, it didn’t.)
Is Ukraine really losing the war, as many recent statements and publications suggest? Spoiler: yes, but not in the way you’d think.
Let’s take a look at what this means.
Read more Ukraine is running out of money again – and the EU is asking questions Shuttle diplomacyThe peace talks involving Steve Witkoff began in February-March 2025, shortly after a phone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump that signaled a fundamental shift in US policy toward Russia and the Ukraine conflict.
Trump’s top priority was to avoid direct involvement, positioning America – as far as possible – at an equal distance from the parties. Of course, to truly achieve this, the conflict would have to be frozen; this would allow the US to restore relations with Russia, counterbalancing China.
Naturally, freezing the conflict (or, in Trump’s words, ending the war in one day) proved impossible; consequently, the US made the most out of the situation as the war dragged on: it shifted the entire burden onto Europe and stepped aside. This strategy allowed the US to maintain working contacts with Russia, reap maximum benefits from the ongoing fighting, and insulate itself from the risks of Ukraine’s potential defeat while still keeping the door open to capitalize on Ukraine’s hypothetical victory over Russia.
In short, Trump decided to sit on the sidelines and watch who would emerge victorious.
For Moscow, too, contacts with Washington are incredibly valuable. It proved impossible to decouple Russia-US relations from the Ukraine issue, and relations between the two countries have effectively remained frozen. Yet the fact that the US is disengaging from the Ukraine conflict – and, more broadly, from European affairs – deprives Europe of confidence in US backing and consequently strips it of strategic depth.
Read more Zelensky’s disgraced prosecutor general attacks anti-graft agencies and flees country The flip side of this maneuver is that the US has effectively relinquished its decisive say regarding Ukraine. Putin and Trump could reach any agreement whatsoever, but Ukraine is now entirely dependent on Europe. This means that it is Europe that will ultimately determine the final terms. As a Russian saying goes, “He who pays for the girl’s dinner gets to dance with her.”
Surely, Trump could exert pressure on all sides, but why bother? He is essentially satisfied with the current situation and needs nothing more from Moscow. So he has simply let things run their course.
Kiev is well aware of this, which is why Ukrainian officials play along with US envoys. Though direct opposition is out of the question – after all, they still need American missile defense systems – they can avoid any action and buy time. And that’s precisely what Kiev is doing.
The fact that Zelensky visited Canada last week but not the US clearly shows that Kiev no longer sees Washington as the primary center of decision-making. Consequently, the negotiation track involving Witkoff and Kushner is seen by the Ukrainian side as little more than a mandatory part of the show.
On September 8, British magazine The Spectator published an editorial titled ‘Ukraine is losing the war’. A week before, several prominent Ukrainian figures – including former Defense Minister Mikhail Fyodorov and the current head of Zelensky’s office, Kirill Budanov – had expressed similar sentiments.
At first glance, this may sound reasonable: the AFU’s deep-strike campaign against Russian infrastructure wasn’t successful, and the summer offensive on the southern front, which is crucial for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), has de facto failed.
Read more Ukraine tried to copy Russia’s battlefield tactics – and walked into a trap Moreover, Ukraine was unprepared for retaliatory strikes targeting port facilities, logistics, energy infrastructure, and transport networks. This confirmed what experts had been saying for over a year: Ukraine’s air defense systems, which are entirely dependent on US supplies and severely depleted, could barely cope with the previous intensity of air raids; now they can shoot down one ballistic missile out of a dozen, at best. This has made it possible for the Russian Army to launch massive attacks on the Ukrainian rear.
Of course, massive raids by Ukrainian drones and, occasionally, cruise missiles also inflict damage on the Russian rear. This summer was marked by a gasoline shortage and long lines at gas stations. Dozens of warehouses in the European part of Russia are in flames, and other targets are under attack as well.
However, the scale of these attacks is incomparable: by various estimates, the AFU managed to disable up to 3% of Russia’s warehouse storage capacity, whereas Russia has disabled between 30% and 60% of Ukraine’s capacity. Ukrainian experts admit that the strikes on Odessa port have had a far greater impact on Ukraine’s fuel logistics than Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries.
For instance, the price of diesel fuel in Ukraine has topped 100 hryvnias, which is nearly three times the cost in Russia. For the first time since the start of the conflict, fuel rationing is being introduced for the AFU (no such measures have ever been implemented for the Russian Armed Forces).
Russian strikes have effectively halted Ukrainian grain exports by sea, depriving the national budget of a key revenue stream. Retail businesses are closing en masse, undermining what is arguably the economy’s last remaining civilian sector.
This looks like an obvious reason why Ukraine is losing the war. So does this mean that all those hysterical reports and articles are actually true?
Read more Welcome to the post-Western weapons market Not quite. I would venture to say that all the above-mentioned factors are merely temporary difficulties to which Ukraine can adapt, and which have little impact on the situation at the front. It’s true that there is a gaping hole worth tens of billions of dollars in the Ukrainian budget; likewise, it’s true that the civilian population will face a harsh winter; and yes, what remains of the energy and industrial sectors is under constant attack.
But all this means that the additional financial burden will fall on Europe’s shoulders, while the civilian sector and the state’s capacity to fulfill social obligations will continue to deteriorate; the people will be left to their fate.
All this will affect not only ordinary citizens but entrepreneurs as well. Ukrainian businesses, which largely supported the Kiev regime and the war simply because there were no other options (given that their future was directly tied to that of the central government), are also being left to fend for themselves.
The central tension in Ukrainian society right now is the smoldering civil conflict between Territorial Centers of Recruitment (TCRs) and the men who are being conscripted by force. The destruction of the civilian economy is likely to spawn similar scenarios: bankrupt entrepreneurs, an impoverished middle class, and the unemployed will all see that the Ukrainian state is doing them more harm than good. As a result, the state itself, and not just state-controlled TCRs, will become the enemy.
One might argue that as opportunities and funds in the civilian sector decline, the military sector becomes more attractive. However, there are no new opportunities in military production and logistics (after all, Ukraine has no money), and fewer people are willing to die on the front lines.
Read more What Russia’s military elite is preparing for behind closed doors All of this will lead to an even greater disconnect between the Ukrainian state and society. And a state severed from society is essentially a military organization. History offers us many such examples, the most recent being ISIS.
A military organization that lacks the support of civil society cannot hold the front line, especially one stretching 1,500 kilometers. There are no historical precedents for this.
A collapse of the front would mean the end of Ukraine in its current form. Kiev understands this perfectly well, which is why it undertakes superhuman efforts to hold the line – even at the cost of a smoldering civil war on the home front.
The detachment of the Ukrainian state from society did not begin yesterday. It started the moment the Ukrainian authorities placed the interests of their Western masters above those of their country.
As winter approaches, Ukraine again finds itself at a crossroads. And it appears to be once again choosing the path of war, a path that it’s being desperately pushed onto by Europe’s anti-Russia coalition.
That is precisely why Witkoff and Kushner left Kiev empty-handed, and why the war will continue – first until the Kiev regime is completely severed from Ukraine, and then until that regime is utterly destroyed.
If you need an example, just look at ISIS.
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