What would Houthi control of Bab al-Mandeb mean for the region? - Middle East Eye

In war, tactical movements can achieve strategic objectives, while strategic manoeuvres can produce operational setbacks. This is perhaps the clearest way to understand the latest battles in Yemen, particularly after Houthi forces entered the city of Mokha.

The mindset that manages a war from a regional and strategic perspective differs fundamentally from one that approaches it through a local lens. This may be the most important distinction between Yemen’s warring camps, including the Houthis, the groups backed by Saudi Arabia, and those supported by the United Arab Emirates.

Mokha and the islands near its coastline should be viewed as part of a battle over a network of routes and maritime passages, rather than simply a decisive contest for control of a city within a local sovereignty conflict backed by two regional powers.

The city’s significance extends far beyond its geographical location or port facilities. It encompasses the supply route connecting Taiz to the coast, the western coastal strip, the approaches to Dhubab and, ultimately, the Yemeni side of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

The advance cuts one of the most important supply routes connecting Taiz and Yemen’s interior to the western coast. This explains why the loss of Mokha carries military consequences inside Yemen.

Regionally, the Houthi advance represents an expansion of Iranian influence and that of its allies. Their ability to exert pressure over two strategic waterways shifts the geopolitical, strategic and military balance in Iran’s favour against the US, Israel and their allies.

What is unfolding is also an organisational collapse in the operational lines of the Yemeni forces backed by Saudi Arabia and its partners.

The fall of Mokha can no longer be described as merely a tactical setback for anti-Houthi forces on the western coast. Subsequent battlefield developments - particularly the arrival of Houthi forces in Dhubab, which directly overlooks the Bab al-Mandeb Strait - shifted the battle from a contest over a city and port into a direct struggle for the land and maritime approaches to one of the world’s most important shipping routes.

The fall of Mokha is therefore a tactical development with strategic consequences, exposing the fragility of the forces affiliated with Yemen’s defence ministry, and of the groups backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

It remains too early to determine the operational trajectory of the war. The Houthi advance could provoke a firm Saudi, American and perhaps Israeli response. Saudi forces have already carried out air strikes on Mokha airport.

The situation must therefore be examined on three levels. The first concerns control of territory and the battlefield. The second is the ability to use the coastline near Bab al-Mandeb as a platform for threatening maritime trade, as well as targeting warships and aircraft carriers. The third is the use of Bab al-Mandeb as leverage in the wider regional confrontation between Iran and its opponents.

Each level offers a different way of assessing the war’s local and regional trajectories, and of understanding its consequences from both strategic and tactical perspectives.

Operationally, the Houthis have achieved several important battlefield objectives. The first has been to consolidate control over areas south of Hodeidah that had previously appeared vulnerable to being lost. The second has been to weaken supply lines between Taiz and the western coast, potentially opening the way for further advances inland.

The capture of Mokha also meant seizing a command and supply centre used by anti-Houthi forces. The advance towards Perim Island and the direct approaches to Bab al-Mandeb followed from these earlier gains, giving the Houthis greater capacity for surveillance, coercion and threat projection, even without exercising complete physical control over maritime traffic.

The offensive launched by the anti-Houthi camp was part of a complex, multi-front campaign encompassing Taiz, Hodeidah, al-Dhale, al-Bayda, Marib, Shabwa and al-Jawf. Its apparent objective was to exhaust the Houthis and prevent them from concentrating their forces exclusively on the western coast.

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project estimated that 276 people were killed in five days of escalation between 3 and 7 September.

Yet these operations and tactics revealed a major failure by Saudi Arabia and its allies to construct a coherent military strategy, particularly at the regional level.

Since 7 October 2023, the Houthis’ operational capabilities, and the precision of their targeting, have demonstrated considerable effectiveness. But Saudi Arabia appears not to have absorbed that lesson, instead building its strategy around optimistic and inaccurate assessments.

The decision to launch the anti-Houthi operation before the forthcoming Israeli and US elections also suggests that the political dimension of the military strategy does not serve clear objectives vis-a-vis Iran. The timing instead coincided with greater cohesion between the US and Israel, which appeared more prepared to become directly involved in Yemen.

The offensive also represents a genuine test of the Mecca defence agreement, signed last month by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan.

While the rapid advance into Dhubab represents an operational success for Ansar Allah (Houthis), it also confronts the group with a more difficult challenge: whether they can transform battlefield momentum into sustainable control.

Their supply lines become longer as they move south, while their positions grow more exposed to air strikes, maritime operations and counterattacks. Controlling Mokha and Dhubab also requires governing new areas, securing roads, ports and infrastructure, and dealing with local populations and displaced communities, rather than merely conducting a military offensive.

Saudi strikes on Mokha airport were likely intended to destroy infrastructure that the Houthis could use to assemble forces, drones and ammunition.

Withdrawing Saudi-backed forces from Mokha might have made tactical sense if the objective was to preserve forces and reorganise them. But it remains politically and militarily costly, as it handed the Houthis rapid momentum and allowed them to move the battle towards Bab al-Mandeb.

One of the central problems is that the anti-Houthi camp is not a unified force, but a collection of actors whose interests overlap without fully aligning. It includes the internationally recognised authorities, the National Resistance Forces led by Tareq Saleh, Taiz-based formations, southern forces, and several tribal and local actors. It also includes Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which maintain different visions of Yemen.

Some forces are focused on restoring the central state. Others seek to preserve southern autonomy, while still others are primarily concerned with ports, the coastline and local influence.

The closer the battle moves towards Bab al-Mandeb, the greater the costs of these divisions become.

The decisive question is therefore not only whether anti-Houthi forces can halt the group’s advances, but whether they can establish a unified field command capable of overcoming political divisions and competition between their regional sponsors.

The Houthis’ arrival in Dhubab, and their advance towards Bab al-Mandeb, threatens Saudi Arabia’s less-disrupted route for oil exports, particularly as Iran exercises significant leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Riyadh could therefore find itself compelled to intervene directly to avoid being constrained at both waterways.

According to a report published by Axios, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman asked US President Donald Trump to launch strikes against the Houthis, but Trump declined direct military intervention for the time being. Washington reportedly instead expressed its readiness to provide Saudi Arabia with intelligence and targeting data.

This suggests that Saudi Arabia wants to expand international support for its operations, while the US prefers to limit its role to protecting freedom of navigation and providing non-combat assistance, avoiding the opening of another direct front in Yemen.

Mohammed bin Salman’s request effectively returns Saudi Arabia to square one of the early days of the Yemen war in 2015. Having learned a hard lesson when the Biden administration leveraged the conflict against it, the Saudis now find that little has changed; relying on Trump’s support is no longer an option. 

Consequently, the Houthis could deal severe blows to energy infrastructure deep within Saudi territory, forcing them to reluctantly accept the status quo, just as in the past.

For the UAE, the fall of Mokha is a direct blow to the model in which it invested along Yemen’s western coast: supporting local partners capable of protecting ports and maritime routes, while confronting the Houthis.

This raises questions about the sustainability of the coastal influence network Abu Dhabi has constructed, and whether the forces linked to it can continue fighting without sustained financial and military support.

Perhaps the most important question, however, concerns the role of ideology in shaping combat effectiveness on the ground. Saleh’s forces have shifted between different camps, leaving them fragmented and vulnerable before a Houthi movement that possesses a coherent vision and a regional political project.

For Egypt, the Houthi advance could create a near-permanent threat to the strait. This may push more vessels to divert around the Cape of Good Hope, reducing traffic through the Suez Canal and damaging its revenues.

The greater danger, however, lies in normalising a security environment in which a paramilitary group can raise the costs of passage, determine which categories of vessels may be targeted and impose constantly changing risks on trade and energy flows.

Even if the Houthis insist that vessels unconnected to Saudi Arabia will not be attacked, shipping and insurance companies base their decisions on risk levels, not political assurances alone.

For Iran, by contrast, the Houthi advance represents a strategic gain, even if Tehran did not directly manage the operation. Having an allied force on the coast of Bab al-Mandeb, alongside Iran’s ability to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, gives Tehran a means of applying pressure at both ends of the Arabian Peninsula.

Iran can therefore benefit from the pressure imposed by the Houthis, without assuming direct responsibility for closing the strait or deploying conventional forces there.

Following the fall of Mokha, the Iranian foreign ministry called on Saudi Arabia to end its blockade of Houthi-controlled areas and to return to negotiations. This reflects Iran’s broader approach: securing and consolidating strategic gains, without entering an open war, thus allowing it to preserve what it has achieved while preparing for the next stage of confrontation.

All of this will have negative consequences for an international economy already struggling with inflation and major crises.

The loss of Bab al-Mandeb would create a major geopolitical chokepoint, driving up energy prices, delaying oil and gas exports, increasing maritime insurance premiums, diverting vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, and disrupting supply chains and container trade.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.